Does He Work for the Saudi People or for Foreign Interests?
THE DEEP FILES | An Investigation into Money, Decisions, Beneficiaries and Outcomes
Does Yasir Al-Rumayyan work for the Saudi people or for foreign interests?
This is not an allegation that the Governor of the Public Investment Fund secretly works for a foreign government or institution. We found no evidence establishing that.
It is a harsher financial question, because answering it does not require knowing anyone’s private intentions. It requires knowing where the money went.
Since the Public Investment Fund became one of the principal engines of Vision 2030, tens of billions of dollars of Saudi sovereign capital have moved into companies, asset managers, sports institutions, projects, banks and advisers outside the Kingdom.
SoftBank.
Blackstone.
Uber.
Tesla.
Lucid.
Magic Leap.
Embracer.
LIV Golf.
FIFA.
And others.
In some cases, the foreign counterparty received direct Saudi capital. In others, it received management or advisory fees. In still others, a struggling company received one Saudi financing round, then another, then another.
So the question is not whether those foreign entities are ‘bad.’ The question is simpler:
Who received Saudi money, how much did they receive, and what came back to Saudi Arabia?
And if an investment lost money or suffered a decline in value:
Who made the decision, and who was held accountable?
PART I — Before judging Al-Rumayyan: which money was entrusted to him, and which value had already been created by the Saudi state?
The most serious mistake in evaluating Yasir Al-Rumayyan’s tenure is to begin with the figure PIF cites today – more than $900 billion in assets under management – compare it with roughly $150 billion in 2015, and conclude that management ‘created’ the difference.
That is not a valid accounting conclusion.
PIF itself identifies four principal funding channels: retained earnings from investments, loans and debt instruments, government capital injections, and government assets transferred to PIF.
Source: PIF funding sources
From the outset, therefore, there are four different stories: Value Created. Capital Supplied. Assets Transferred. Money Borrowed.
They cannot be collapsed into a single number and then described as ‘investment success.’
1. $40 billion in cash from the government
In March and April 2020, the Saudi government transferred SAR150 billion – approximately $40 billion – to PIF. This is recorded in PIF’s own investor documentation.
Source: PIF 2025 sukuk circular
The $40 billion was not a profit generated by Al-Rumayyan. It was capital supplied by the owner to the Fund.
The proper performance question is: What did PIF do with the $40 billion, and what did it become?
2. Then came Aramco
In February 2022, 4% of Saudi Aramco was transferred to PIF. In April 2023, another 4% was transferred to Sanabil, a wholly owned PIF company. In March 2024, another 8% was transferred to two wholly owned PIF companies.
Source: PIF 2025 sukuk circular
Total transferred into the PIF ecosystem: 16% of Saudi Aramco.
PIF did not acquire these stakes from the state through a conventional market purchase. The state transferred them.
3. The second 4% alone
PIF’s 2022 financial statements disclose, in subsequent events, that the 4% transferred in 2023 had a fair value on the transfer date of SAR291.280 billion.
Source: PIF 2022 statements
That is crucial. Roughly SAR291 billion of value entered the PIF ecosystem through an owner transfer. It cannot properly be described as investment return generated by the investment manager.
4. 2023: SAR310.150 billion of contributions
- Assets and investments received: SAR292.221bn
- Funding received by subsidiaries: SAR16.158bn
- Cash received from the Owner: SAR1.286bn
- Other in-kind contributions: SAR485m
Total: SAR310.150 billion.
Source: PIF 2024 statements
5. 2024: the figure more than doubles
- Assets and investments received: SAR617.714bn
- Funding received by subsidiaries: SAR385m
- Cash received from the Owner: SAR16.185bn
- In-kind contributions: SAR11.080bn
Total: SAR645.364 billion.
Source: PIF 2024 statements
2023 plus 2024 alone: SAR955.514 billion.
Add the SAR150 billion cash transfer in 2020 and the documented contributions/transfers in those three years alone exceed SAR1.1 trillion.
6. Aramco did not merely add AUM
When the state transferred the additional 8% of Aramco in March 2024, the official announcement stated that the transfer would strengthen PIF’s financial position and credit rating.
Source: PIF Aramco 2024 transfer
Aramco’s effect therefore does not stop at the market value of the shares. The asset also strengthens the balance-sheet profile.
The resulting question is unavoidable: What would PIF’s leverage, credit profile and borrowing capacity look like without the transferred Aramco stake?
7. AUM growth in 2024
PIF announced that AUM increased 19% to SAR3.42 trillion, or approximately $913 billion.
Source: PIF 2024 performance
Owner contributions during the same year were SAR645.364 billion.
That does not mean the difference is a ‘loss.’ AUM is not a simple accounting reconciliation of contributions plus profits minus losses. But it does mean that an increase in AUM is not synonymous with investment return.
PART II — 2024: What happens when we look beneath the headline of ‘growth’?
PIF announced asset growth. Its financial statements show a more complicated picture.
8. Net profit is not the whole picture
PIF publishes audited IFRS financial statements. The issue is therefore not that the Fund ‘does not publish losses.’ The stronger and more accurate criticism is that understanding performance requires reading the detailed notes rather than relying only on revenue, profit and AUM headlines.
Source: PIF financial statements
9. SAR74.745 billion of non-financial asset impairment
Within 2024 administrative expenses, the group recorded SAR74.745 billion of impairment of non-financial assets.
Source: PIF 2024 statements
An impairment does not mean SAR74.745 billion of cash disappeared at that moment. It means the recoverable value of relevant assets no longer supported the amount at which they had been carried.
The investigative question is not semantic: Which earlier decisions, assumptions or cost estimates led to the write-down?
10. The PPE map
Property, plant and equipment impairment was approximately SAR64.54 billion. The statements allocate major amounts across cash-generating groups including land mobility, hospitality and real estate, industrial activities, and corporate/other assets.
Source: PIF 2024 statements
The impairment analysis refers to factors including expected costs to complete projects, changes in operating plans and market conditions.
That converts the impairment into a chain of accountability questions: Who prepared the original cost? Who approved it? Who forecast demand? Who set the discount assumptions? Who first knew that the numbers no longer worked?
11. The advisers
The statements refer in impairment testing to forecasts and inputs associated with external advisers. In the same year the group recorded billions of riyals in categories including investment advisory expenses and consultancy, legal and professional fees.
Source: PIF 2024 statements
We therefore need a complete Beneficiary Ledger – not guessed names, but the actual recipients, the amount each received, the project concerned, and the work performed.
PART III — The 2020 crisis portfolio: What happened to the $40 billion?
This was largely absent from the previous draft even though it is central to the capital-allocation record.
After the government transferred SAR150 billion in March and April 2020, U.S. SEC filings showed a substantial U.S. listed-equity portfolio.
12. The first-quarter snapshot
- Boeing: 4,785,281 shares, reported value approximately $713.7m.
- BP ADR: 33,938,127, approximately $827.8m.
- Carnival: 34,689,148, approximately $456.9m.
- Citigroup: 12,392,668, approximately $522.0m.
- Disney: 5,132,522, approximately $495.8m.
- Facebook: 3,128,653, approximately $521.9m.
Source: SEC PIF Q1 2020 13F
13. Three months later, the portfolio had changed
- Carnival: 50,830,926 shares.
- Live Nation: 12,565,167 shares.
- Suncor: 50,975,315 shares.
Source: SEC PIF Q2 2020 13F
A Form 13F is a quarter-end snapshot. The disappearance of a security does not tell us the sale date or execution price.
Therefore the required disclosure is realized P&L for the 2020 crisis portfolio: purchase price, sale price, dividends, foreign exchange, fees and net IRR.
PART IV — Tesla versus Lucid: perhaps the comparison that reveals the investment philosophy most clearly
In 2018 PIF built a significant position in Tesla. In January 2019 it used an equity collar to hedge most of the position, limiting downside exposure but also limiting full participation in upside. By the end of 2019 the position had been reduced to a very small residual holding.
The enormous subsequent rise in Tesla is not properly described as a realized loss to PIF. It is foregone upside – an opportunity cost.
But the contrast with Lucid remains striking:
Tesla: hedge -> near exit.
Lucid: investment -> additional investment -> preferred capital -> credit facility -> additional capital.
Why did the two cases receive such different capital-allocation treatment?
PART V — Lucid: from a billion-dollar investment to a financing ecosystem
PIF’s Lucid relationship began with an investment exceeding $1 billion in 2018. It later expanded through further equity, preferred securities and credit exposure.
14. The financing chain
- 2018: more than $1bn initial PIF investment.
- 2023: approximately $1.8bn through Ayar.
- March 2024: $1bn convertible preferred investment.
- August 2024: $750m preferred capital, alongside a $750m delayed-draw facility.
- April 2026: a further $550m preferred investment.
Source: Lucid Aug 2024 financing
15. The credit exposure expanded
By 2026 the relationship was no longer merely an equity story. Lucid filings showed an expanded delayed-draw credit structure and further borrowings.
Source: Lucid 2026 10-Q
The central question is therefore no longer ‘How many shares does PIF own?’ It is: What is total Saudi equity, preferred and credit exposure to Lucid, how much has been drawn, and what is the recoverable value of each layer?
16. Against that capital
Lucid’s 2026 filings continued to report substantial accumulated deficits, operating losses and negative cash flows.
Source: Lucid Q1 2026
Lucid’s accumulated deficit is not the same as PIF’s loss. But repeated sovereign capital support makes a stop-loss question unavoidable: At what point does additional funding cease to represent the original investment thesis and become capital preservation?
17. The Saudi decision chain inside Lucid
Turqi Al-Nowaiser is a senior PIF executive responsible for international investments and has held a major governance role at Lucid.
Source: PIF leadership
For every Lucid financing round, PIF should disclose: Who recommended it? Who valued the company? Who approved it? Did Al-Nowaiser vote? Did Al-Rumayyan vote? Was either recused because of portfolio-company board roles? What approval threshold applied?
PART VI — Magic Leap: when an investor becomes a provider of survival capital
In March 2018 PIF invested $400 million in Magic Leap.
Source: PIF Magic Leap
PIF later obtained control of the company and additional Saudi capital followed.
The required accounting is simple: total PIF capital into Magic Leap, current fair value, cash returned, and independent exit value without an assumption of future PIF funding.
If an independent buyer would not pay the carrying value without continued sovereign support, that gap matters.
PART VII — Vision Fund: up to $45 billion under a structure linked to SoftBank
The 2016-2017 SoftBank Vision Fund arrangements contemplated a PIF commitment of up to $45 billion over five years, making PIF the largest investor in the fund.
Source: PIF Vision Fund
Source: SoftBank Vision Fund launch
The $45 billion figure is a commitment, not a loss. The correct Saudi ledger requires capital actually called, cash distributions, preferred distributions, management fees, carried interest, residual NAV and PIF-specific net IRR.
The investigation should not judge the Vision Fund merely by collecting famous failures or famous successes. It needs the Saudi investor’s actual LP account.
PART VIII — Blackstone: up to $20 billion for U.S. infrastructure
In 2017 PIF and Blackstone announced definitive documentation for a U.S.-focused infrastructure program under which PIF could commit up to $20 billion. The stated ambition was to help create a $40 billion equity vehicle and, with leverage, more than $100 billion of infrastructure investments.
Source: PIF Blackstone
The announcement explicitly discussed modernizing U.S. infrastructure and creating American jobs.
That does not make the investment improper. It makes the Saudi return question essential: How much capital was called? What management fees were paid? What distributions were received? What is current NAV? What is PIF’s net IRR? And what measurable Saudi economic benefit resulted?
PART IX — Russia: a framework reaching up to $10 billion
PIF investor documents also describe investment platforms and agreements with the Russian Direct Investment Fund reaching an aggregate framework of up to $10 billion during the 2015-2017 period.
Source: PIF 2025 sukuk circular
Again, a framework or ceiling is not proof that the entire amount was paid or lost. PIF should disclose the amount actually deployed, the assets acquired, current value, exits and any restrictions created by later geopolitical and sanctions developments.
PART X — Uber: $3.5 billion and the comparison test
In 2016 PIF invested $3.5 billion in Uber and obtained a board seat.
Source: PIF Uber
At the time, Al-Rumayyan publicly framed the investment in terms that included attractive long-term financial returns.
That gives the public a benchmark set by PIF itself: publish the realized and unrealized return on Uber since 2016 after all relevant cash flows and costs.
Uber also makes a useful three-way comparison: Uber – Hold. Tesla – Hedge and almost exit. Lucid – Repeatedly add capital. If there is a coherent capital-allocation rule, PIF should be able to explain it numerically.
PART XI — Embracer: paying a premium before the crisis
In June 2022 Savvy Games Group subscribed for approximately 99.9 million Embracer B shares for SEK10.3 billion at SEK103.47 per share, a 15% premium to the prior closing price.
Source: Embracer directed issue
In May 2023 Embracer disclosed that a major transformative strategic partnership had not materialized and sharply reduced its outlook. A large restructuring followed.
Source: Embracer FY22/23
Savvy did not necessarily cause Embracer’s later crisis. The Saudi accountability question is different: Why was a 15% premium justified? What valuation and downside case supported the investment? Was the later-failed strategic partnership part of the Saudi investment thesis? When did Savvy representatives learn it was at risk?
PART XII — Savvy does not stop at Embracer
Savvy later paid $4.9 billion to acquire Scopely. Scopely subsequently produced major commercial successes, so it should not automatically be classified as a loss.
The same test must nevertheless apply: purchase price, additional capital, debt, EBITDA, free cash flow, distributions and current independent valuation. Did the transaction create value above the $4.9 billion purchase price?
PART XIII — LIV Golf: more than $5 billion, followed by a change in funding
Public reporting has placed PIF’s support for LIV Golf above $5 billion since launch. The exact cumulative Saudi exposure, however, should be disclosed by PIF rather than reconstructed from fragments.
The questions are financial: cumulative revenue, operating losses, media rights, sponsorship, team values, external equity value, and the amount of Saudi capital that went to players, executives, consultants, venues, production, legal work and marketing.
18. Project Wedge
The planning work preceding LIV makes a Beneficiary Ledger especially important. Who built the revenue forecasts? Who estimated audience and media-rights value? Who prepared the downside case? Who approved spending assumptions? And after actual results became available, was any adviser held accountable for forecast accuracy?
PART XIV — Newcastle: not every investment belongs in the loss column
Newcastle United is a different type of asset. PIF led the consortium that acquired the club in 2021. A sports franchise can appreciate materially, so its purchase price cannot automatically be entered into a ‘loss’ table.
The proper ledger is purchase price, follow-on capital, loans, revenue growth, current independent valuation, dividends and infrastructure commitments. Only then can return be assessed.
PART XV — FIFA: when the price is undisclosed, ROI matters even more
PIF has entered FIFA sponsorship arrangements whose commercial terms have not been publicly itemized in the announcements reviewed.
The required questions are straightforward: sponsorship fee, activation spending, hospitality, travel, intermediaries, commissions, approved KPI and measured commercial return.
When the price is undisclosed, the burden of demonstrating value for sovereign capital becomes greater, not smaller.
PART XVI — Aramco-FIFA: it must be separated from PIF-FIFA
Al-Rumayyan is Chairman of Saudi Aramco and Governor of PIF, but the two organizations are legally and financially distinct. Aramco’s FIFA sponsorship and PIF’s FIFA relationships must therefore be examined separately.
For each: Who approved it? What did it cost? Did Al-Rumayyan participate in the relevant vote? What approval threshold applied? What ROI was approved and what ROI was achieved?
His senior position in both institutions does not prove that he personally negotiated either contract. It does make disclosure of his role in approval a legitimate governance question.
PART XVII — Saudi giga-projects: the problem is not only overseas
An investigation focused only on American and European investments would miss half the capital-allocation story. PIF’s 2024 accounts recorded very large non-financial impairments, while Saudi giga-projects continue to absorb substantial equity and debt financing.
19. NEOM
NEOM obtained a SAR10 billion revolving credit facility in 2024. Borrowing by a large company is not itself evidence of distress. The relevant question is total exposure: PIF equity, government contributions, corporate debt, project finance, guarantees, capitalized interest and current recoverable value.
20. THE LINE
The investigation needs board-approved scope, board-approved capex, revised capex, actual spend, revised completion assumptions and any impairment. Promotional vision must be separated from the financial plan actually approved by the capital allocator.
21. ROSHN
ROSHN should be tested project by project: land contributed, infrastructure, units planned, units completed, units sold, selling prices, receivables, margins and impairments – alongside leadership changes, contractors and the decision chain.
22. Red Sea, Qiddiya and Diriyah
The same ledger applies: capital injected, debt, revenue, cash flow, carrying value, impairment, private capital attracted, jobs actually created, tourism or attendance, and cost per measurable outcome.
PART XVIII — Debt: PIF does not grow only with state money
PIF itself identifies loans and debt instruments as a core funding source.
Source: PIF funding sources
An increase in gross assets financed with debt is not an equivalent increase in net wealth. Any evaluation must therefore place gross assets beside debt and net assets/equity.
23. Cost of financing
Where borrowing finances a qualifying project, accounting rules may allow some interest to be capitalized into the cost of the asset rather than immediately expensed. If project economics later deteriorate, impairment can follow.
The investigative sequence is therefore: Borrow -> Capitalize -> Build -> Reforecast -> Impair.
The decisive question is: When did management know?
PART XIX — Who made the decision?
It would be inaccurate to write ‘Al-Rumayyan decided’ beside every transaction without evidence. PIF describes a governance structure involving its Board, executive management and investment committees, with delegated authorities.
Source: PIF leadership
Each major transaction should therefore carry a Decision Ledger:
- Originator
- Investment team
- External adviser
- Investment committee
- Board committee
- Board
- Final signatory
- PIF representative on the portfolio-company board
24. Turqi Al-Nowaiser
Al-Nowaiser is a senior PIF investment executive with responsibility for international investments and governance roles in major portfolio companies.
Source: PIF leadership
For Lucid, Uber, Tesla, Vision Fund, Magic Leap, Blackstone and other international investments, the investigation should identify his documented role rather than assume it.
25. Yasir Al-Rumayyan
He is the Governor. He should therefore define the boundary himself: Which transactions did he personally recommend? Which did he vote on? Which required Board approval above his authority? Which were delegated? Which did not involve him in final approval?
If he does not want every PIF transaction attributed personally to him, PIF should publish the Decision Ledger.
PART XX — The beneficiaries
The investigation must move from ‘Where did PIF invest?’ to a deeper question: Who received money even when PIF did not obtain the expected result?
- Company shareholders
- Fund managers
- Management-fee recipients
- Investment banks
- Law firms
- Consultants
- Executives
- Players and athletes
- Contractors
- Developers
- Debt providers
These can all be legitimate recipients under valid contracts. That is precisely why the investigation needs the numbers rather than insinuation.
26. An adviser does not necessarily lose when the client loses
If PIF pays an adviser for a feasibility study and the project later fails, the adviser may already have been paid in full. If PIF restructures the project, another adviser – or even the same adviser – may receive a new mandate.
The required comparison is: Original Adviser vs Restructuring Adviser. If the same name appears on both sides, ask why; do not assume wrongdoing.
PART XXI — Foregone upside is not the same as a loss
Tesla is the clearest example. Had PIF retained its former stake, it would have participated in the later rise. That does not mean PIF ‘lost’ an amount equal to the hypothetical future gain.
It is Foregone Upside / Opportunity Cost.
That is distinct from Realized Loss, Unrealized Loss, Impairment, Operating Loss, and Capital Still at Risk.
Keeping these categories separate makes the investigation more accurate and harder to dismiss.
PART XXII — The test that should be applied to every investment
1. Capital In — How much did PIF pay?
2. Additional Capital — How much was paid later?
3. Cash Out — How much came back through sales or distributions?
4. Current Value — What is the asset worth now?
5. Total Costs — Fees, financing, advisory costs and FX.
6. Net Return — IRR / MOIC.
Then add a separate measure: Economic Impact in Saudi Arabia.
PART XXIII — The Aramco test
Run the PIF calculation again on an Ex-Aramco basis. Remove the value of the Aramco shares transferred by the state, the dividend income generated by those transferred shares, and any valuation effect attributable to them.
Then ask: What is PIF’s profit? What is TSR? What is AUM? What is leverage? What is the credit profile?
This is not an assertion that PIF would necessarily be loss-making. It is a demand to distinguish value created by management from value supplied by the state.
PART XXIV — The second test: Ex-State-Transfers
Then go further. Exclude not only Aramco but state cash injections, land, equity securities, companies transferred and other in-kind owner contributions.
Retain only the value PIF created after receiving those assets.
That is the number closest to Manager-Generated Value.
PART XXV — The question that follows every file
- Tesla: Why did you exit?
- Lucid: Why did you continue adding capital?
- Magic Leap: Why did funding continue?
- Vision Fund: What is the net return?
- Blackstone: What came back to Saudi Arabia?
- Embracer: Why pay a premium?
- LIV: What is the asset worth after more than $5 billion of support?
- NEOM: How much capital, and how much impairment?
- FIFA: How much did you pay?
- Advisers: Who got paid?
- Aramco: How much of PIF’s financial strength came from it?
They all reduce to one question: What is the capital-allocation rule?
PART XXVI — Does he work for the Saudi people or for foreign interests?
The documents reviewed do not establish that Al-Rumayyan secretly works for a foreign interest.
They do establish that, under his tenure, very large amounts of Saudi capital were allocated to foreign companies, asset managers and international projects, while the Saudi state itself supplied PIF with enormous amounts of cash and transferred assets.
The financial burden of proof is therefore simple: Show the return.
When a foreign infrastructure program is explicitly designed to create jobs abroad, the Saudi question is: What was our return?
When Lucid receives billions: What is our stake worth?
When Magic Leap receives more funding: Why?
When SoftBank receives a sovereign commitment measured in tens of billions: What came back?
When a golfer receives a major contract: What asset value resulted?
This is not hostility to foreigners. It is capital accounting.
PART XXVII — What do we know so far about Al-Rumayyan’s record?
We know PIF became dramatically larger.
We also know the government injected and transferred enormous value into it.
We know PIF used debt.
We know some investments succeeded or continue to carry substantial value.
We know some required repeated additional capital.
We know the group recorded major impairments.
And we know AUM alone cannot tell us how much of the growth was generated by investment management.
The most important number remains unanswered: How many riyals of net value did PIF management create above the capital and assets supplied by the Saudi state?
PART XXVIII — Questions for Yasir Al-Rumayyan
1. Of the growth in PIF AUM since 2015, how much came from investment returns and how much came from the state?
2. What is the total value of all government cash and in-kind contributions to PIF since 2015?
3. What was the value, at transfer date, of every government asset transferred to PIF?
4. How much value has PIF created after excluding those transfers?
5. What is PIF’s performance after excluding transferred Aramco holdings?
6. How much Aramco dividend income entered PIF and its wholly owned companies in each year?
7. What would PIF’s leverage and credit profile look like without Aramco?
8. How much capital was actually called under PIF’s up-to-$45bn Vision Fund commitment?
9. How much cash has PIF received back from the Vision Fund?
10. How much did PIF bear in management fees and carried interest?
11. What is PIF’s specific net IRR on the Vision Fund?
12. How much was actually deployed under the Blackstone infrastructure commitment of up to $20bn?
13. What distributions, current value and return has PIF received from that program?
14. How much was actually deployed under the RDIF platforms whose framework reached up to $10bn?
15. What is the current value of those investments?
16. What realized return has PIF earned from Uber since 2016?
17. Why did PIF hedge and then almost entirely exit Tesla?
18. Who made the decision to enter the Tesla equity collar?
19. Why was the capital-allocation policy toward Tesla so different from Lucid?
20. What is the total amount of PIF/Ayar capital paid into Lucid?
21. What is the total credit exposure to Lucid, and how much has been drawn?
22. What is the current fair value of each layer of Lucid exposure?
23. At what point does additional Lucid funding become capital preservation rather than a new investment?
24. What is the total amount paid by PIF into Magic Leap?
25. What is Magic Leap’s current independent exit value?
26. Why did funding continue after Magic Leap’s business model changed?
27. Who approved the SEK10.3bn Embracer investment?
28. Why was a 15% premium paid?
29. Was the strategic partnership that later failed part of the Saudi investment thesis?
30. What is the current return on Scopely?
31. How much has PIF actually spent on LIV Golf?
32. What is LIV Golf’s cumulative revenue?
33. What are LIV Golf’s cumulative operating losses?
34. What equity value could be sold today to an independent investor?
35. Who prepared the forecasts used in Project Wedge?
36. How much did PIF and/or its companies pay to FIFA?
37. What KPI was used to approve the sponsorship?
38. Which projects generated the 2024 PPE impairments?
39. How much of those impairments relates to NEOM?
40. How much relates to each giga-project?
41. Who prepared the original cost forecasts?
42. Who were the external advisers used in valuations and impairment tests?
43. How much was each adviser paid?
44. Did any adviser receive a restructuring mandate for a project it had previously advised on, designed or valued?
45. What is the total amount of capitalized interest embedded in the projects?
46. When did management first know that costs or schedules had departed materially from the approved business case?
47. Which of these decisions did you personally approve?
48. Which were approved by the Board?
49. Which were delegated to the Management Investment Committee?
50. Which did not involve you in the final approval?
PART XXIX — The accountability question
Identify one major transaction in which the original investment assumptions failed materially and the person or body responsible for recommending or approving the transaction faced a documented professional consequence because of that failure.
If such examples exist, publish them.
If they do not, how does accountability operate inside an institution managing more than $900 billion?
PART XXX — Conclusion: The state gave you the money. What did you do with it?
Yasir Al-Rumayyan cannot be evaluated by the number of companies in which PIF owns shares.
Nor by the number of conferences.
Nor by AUM alone.
Nor by photographs with global corporate leaders.
The measure is capital entrusted to management versus value returned.
The state transferred cash.
The state transferred shares.
The state transferred Aramco.
PIF borrowed.
Then came capital allocation.
That is where the investment manager’s accountability begins.
Saudi Arabia owned Aramco before its shares reached PIF. It owned the land and state assets before they were transferred. It owned the cash before it was injected.
So the question for Al-Rumayyan is not: How much do you now control?
It is: How much value did you create above what you were given?
How much went overseas? How much came back? How much was paid in fees? How much lost value? How much remains at risk? Who was held accountable when the assumptions failed?
And that returns us to the question at the beginning of this investigation:
Yasir Al-Rumayyan, do you work for the Saudi people or for the foreign interests that received billions of dollars of Saudi capital?
We are not claiming to know your private intention. We do not need to.
Let the money record answer.
- What the state gave you.
- What you borrowed in the Fund’s name.
- What you paid.
- Whom you paid.
- What came back.
- What lost value.
- What remains at risk.
- Who made the decision.
If the record demonstrates that the Saudi people were the ultimate beneficiary, the numbers will demonstrate it.
If the numbers cannot demonstrate it, the size of the Fund is not an answer.
Right of Reply
Before publication, THE DEEP FILES should send the detailed questions arising from this investigation to Yasir Al-Rumayyan, the Public Investment Fund and, where appropriate, the officials and entities connected to each file.
If no substantive response has been received by publication:
We sent detailed questions arising from this investigation to Yasir Al-Rumayyan and the Public Investment Fund. As of publication, no substantive response had been received. We will publish any substantive response received after publication and identify when it arrived.
A failure to respond is not an admission.
But it does not erase a documented question.
Where did the money go, and what came back to the Saudi people?
