Bader Al-Asaker: Power, Private Networks, Twitter, International Assets and the Questions Saudi Arabia Has Not Answered
Evidence standard: established facts are stated as facts; allegations are identified as allegations; unresolved matters are presented as questions.
Introduction
Some figures appear in the news every day. Others may be considerably more important even though the public rarely sees them.
Bader bin Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Asaker belongs to the second category.
This is not the story of a man holding one position that can be assessed through a ministry budget or the results of a listed company. It is the story of a path that begins in private business, youth initiatives and entrepreneurship, passes through the Misk Foundation, and ends inside one of the closest private circles surrounding Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
Then the more difficult threads begin.
A U.S. criminal case established that a former Twitter employee received a luxury watch and hundreds of thousands of dollars in the context of a scheme involving access to information about Saudi users critical of the government.
Luxembourg documents reveal a Saudi company called Eight Investment Company.
Other documents reveal Prestigestate.
Then Bader Al-Asaker, together with two other men, appears in the Luxembourg beneficial-ownership record for that company.
The company in turn leads into the structure associated with Chateau Louis XIV in France.
Eight Investment then appears in South Africa, inside Manupont 124 and the Ekland Safaris project.
Names recur across jurisdictions: Thamer Nassief, Hans Cauchi and Graham Moon.
Manupont is then transferred from Eight to a Cayman Islands company called Willow.
The project remains.
Some managers remain.
Development continues.
Then Project Zebra appears.
The record reveals a major redevelopment, a private airstrip, hospitality facilities, water infrastructure and other works, followed by a Section 24G environmental rectification process concerning activities commenced before the required prior environmental authorization.
This investigation does not assume that these facts collectively prove corruption.
It does not assume that every company connected to Bader Al-Asaker is his personal property.
It does not assume that Al-Asaker personally purchased every asset connected to Eight.
It does not assume that every allegation made in litigation has become an established fact.
The principle is simpler:
What the documents establish, we will state clearly.
What remains an allegation will be described as an allegation.
What remains unexplained will be placed before Bader Al-Asaker, the relevant institutions and the Saudi public as a question that deserves an answer.
1. Who Is Bader Al-Asaker?
The full name commonly used in official and public records is Bader bin Mohammed bin Abdulaziz bin Asaker, also rendered in English records as Bader Mohammed A. Binasaker.
Published biographies place him in a legal and commercial background. Arab News reported that he obtained a bachelor’s degree from King Saud University and held roles in private business, including deputy general manager of Al-Asaker Establishment for electronic systems and air conditioning, and vice president at Al-Salhia Dates and Sweets. He also participated in the Council of Saudi Chambers and the Young Businessmen Committee at the Riyadh Chamber.
His name also appeared as secretary-general of the Prince Salman Award for Young Entrepreneurs during the earlier stage of his rise in Saudi youth and entrepreneurship initiatives.
He later became secretary-general of the Mohammed bin Salman Foundation, Misk, and appeared officially representing it in agreements and programs in Saudi Arabia and abroad.
The most important change in his official status came in July 2017.
Royal Order A/305 appointed him Director of the Crown Prince’s Private Office for Private Affairs, at the rank of minister.
Later Saudi institutional sources continued to describe him in the Crown Prince’s private-office environment, and he also appeared on the board of the Saudi Sports for All Federation.
This is therefore not an investigation into a businessman detached from the state.
It concerns a person who officially reached ministerial rank inside the Crown Prince’s private office.
That fact makes financial, corporate and asset-management structures connected to him particularly deserving of clarity, especially when they intersect with people and companies operating across multiple jurisdictions.
2. Before the Private Office: Youth, Business and Misk
Al-Asaker’s path before 2017 matters because it shows his gradual movement into the circle that would later sit near the center of Saudi decision-making.
He worked around youth and entrepreneurship initiatives, the King Salman Youth Center and then Misk.
In 2017 Misk itself organized the Tweeps Forum, focused directly on social media. Al-Asaker publicly discussed responsible use of social platforms and efforts to counter extremism and hate speech.
That public-facing role is relevant because an entirely different relationship had begun several years earlier between Al-Asaker and an employee inside Twitter.
This time the evidence does not rest merely on press speculation.
It comes from a U.S. federal criminal case.
3. June 13, 2014: The Meeting at Twitter
On June 13, 2014, Bader Al-Asaker visited Twitter headquarters in San Francisco as part of a Saudi delegation.
There he met Twitter employee Ahmad Abouammo.
That relationship later became a central element of a U.S. criminal prosecution that ended in Abouammo’s conviction.
The Ninth Circuit and U.S. government filings documented the relationship, communications, gifts, payments and unauthorized access to user information.
One distinction must remain clear throughout this investigation:
Bader Al-Asaker was not the defendant convicted in that criminal case.
Ahmad Abouammo was the defendant who was tried and convicted.
But the evidentiary record places Al-Asaker directly inside the chain of events examined at trial.
4. London: The Hublot Watch
In December 2014, Abouammo met Al-Asaker in London.
Following the meeting, Abouammo possessed a luxury Hublot watch given to him by Al-Asaker.
The value used when Abouammo later attempted to sell the watch was approximately $42,000.
The U.S. Department of Justice and the Ninth Circuit discussed the watch as part of the evidentiary record.
The story did not stop with the watch.
On January 17, 2015, Al-Asaker sent Abouammo a communication connected to what they had discussed in London concerning the Twitter account @mujtahidd, attaching material related to the account.
@Mujtahidd was a widely followed anonymous account critical of the Saudi royal family and government.
Access to information concerning critical users subsequently became part of the criminal case.
5. User Data
The U.S. Department of Justice stated that Abouammo used his internal Twitter access to obtain nonpublic information concerning Saudi users critical of the government and that information was supplied to Saudi officials.
A 2026 U.S. government filing states more specifically that Abouammo disclosed identifying information concerning critical Saudi users to Bader Binasaker.
The evidentiary record included @mujtahidd and other targeted accounts.
The case showed that Abouammo accessed information including email addresses, telephone numbers and IP addresses even though his Media Partnerships role did not provide a legitimate business reason for those accesses.
These are not theories created by THE DEEP FILES.
They are facts examined by a jury, an appellate court and the U.S. Department of Justice.
6. $300,000
After the relationship began, the financial transfers appeared.
U.S. government materials describe three payments from Al-Asaker to Abouammo:
$100,000.
Then $100,000.
Then another $100,000.
Total: $300,000.
That was in addition to the Hublot watch.
The first two payments went to a Bank Audi account in Lebanon opened in the name of Abouammo’s father, while Abouammo retained practical control over the money.
The third payment later went to a business account associated with a consulting company created by Abouammo.
The U.S. government characterized the payments in the prosecution as bribes, and Abouammo was convicted of offenses including acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government, fraud-related offenses, money laundering and falsifying a record with intent to obstruct an investigation.
In 2022 he was sentenced to 42 months in federal prison. Subsequent proceedings altered the sentence after appeal and resentencing.
Again:
The conviction was Abouammo’s. It was not a criminal conviction of Bader Al-Asaker.
But the source of the payments and Al-Asaker’s relationship with Abouammo were part of the prosecution’s evidence.
7. The Unanswered Question: From Which Account Did the Money Come?
A significant gap remains.
We know the recipient.
We know the amounts.
We know the Lebanese destination account.
We know about the watch.
But the public materials reviewed for this investigation have not produced a bank record clearly identifying the originating account for all three transfers.
Were they Al-Asaker’s personal funds?
Did they originate from a company?
Did they come from an entity associated with the private office?
Were they connected to Misk?
Did they originate from another investment vehicle?
The evidence reviewed does not permit us to select one of these possibilities.
The direct question to Bader Al-Asaker is therefore:
From which account and economic source did the $300,000 originate?
8. An Invoice Created During the FBI Interview
When FBI agents questioned Abouammo in October 2018, he attempted to explain one payment as compensation for consulting services associated with Misk.
Evidence presented by the government showed that an invoice used to support that explanation was created during a short period while FBI agents were waiting at the residence, and Abouammo was convicted of falsifying a record with intent to obstruct the investigation.
That does not automatically establish what Al-Asaker intended the payment to represent.
It does, however, severely weaken Abouammo’s later explanation that the payment was simply supported by an ordinary pre-existing consulting invoice.
9. The Court and Al-Asaker’s Government Status
Abouammo’s appeal raised questions concerning whether the person with whom he dealt qualified as a foreign official for purposes relevant to the case.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the evidence was sufficient for the jury.
Among the evidence was an A-2 visa application connected to a May 2015 U.S. trip.
The application described Al-Asaker’s occupation as government, listed the Royal Court as his employer and identified him as a foreign official or employee.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that a rational jury could treat the evidence as sufficient to find the relevant governmental status.
That matters because attempts to separate the Twitter affair entirely from governmental functions must contend with an official document used in federal court.
10. Ali Alzabarah
Abouammo was not the only Twitter employee appearing in the case.
Ali Alzabarah, a Twitter engineer, had broader technical access to user information.
U.S. government materials state that Abouammo introduced Alzabarah into the network involving Al-Asaker and that Alzabarah later accessed numerous accounts in connection with Saudi interests.
After Twitter confronted him in December 2015 regarding suspicious access to an account, Alzabarah left the United States for Saudi Arabia.
Case materials indicate that he later worked at Misk.
A crucial institutional question follows:
Who hired Ali Alzabarah at Misk after his departure from Twitter?
We found no document proving that Al-Asaker personally made the hiring decision.
We therefore do not attribute that decision to him.
But given his senior role at Misk during the period, the circumstances of Alzabarah’s later employment deserve an answer.
11. Ahmed Almutairi and Smaat
A third name is Ahmed Almutairi, also rendered in some U.S. records as Ahmed Aljbreen.
He was associated with Smaat, a Saudi social-media company, and was among the individuals charged by the United States in connection with the Twitter case.
The relationship among Almutairi, Alzabarah, Abouammo and Al-Asaker requires a complete reconstruction from communication records.
The existence of those relationships does not prove that Al-Asaker personally ordered every account access.
The unanswered questions are narrower and more useful:
Who selected the accounts?
Who requested the information?
And where did the information go after it was obtained?
12. Abdulrahman Al-Sadhan
One of the most serious later cases concerns Abdulrahman Al-Sadhan.
In May 2023, Abdulrahman and his sister Areej filed a federal lawsuit in California against Twitter/X, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saud Al-Qahtani, Ahmad Abouammo, Ali Alzabarah, Ahmed Almutairi, Bader Al-Asaker and others.
The complaint contains serious allegations involving surveillance of users and dissidents, disclosure of anonymous identities and subsequent harm.
But it is a civil complaint containing plaintiffs’ allegations.
It is not a judicial finding that Al-Asaker caused Al-Sadhan’s arrest or mistreatment.
The unresolved evidentiary question is:
Did information obtained from Twitter contribute to identifying the person behind the @Sama7ti account and subsequently reach Saudi authorities?
The plaintiffs allege a connection.
The public record reviewed for this investigation does not yet establish the entire causal chain through a final judgment.
13. Ali Al-Ahmed and Other Accounts
Other civil litigation addressed unauthorized access to information concerning Saudi users, including activist Ali Al-Ahmed.
Court records describe allegations concerning the acquisition and provision of user information, while claims directed at Al-Asaker remain allegations unless established through a judgment or criminal finding.
Other account names surfaced in trial reporting and related records, but the identities of some account owners and the consequences of the accesses remain unresolved.
The proper evidentiary target is therefore not speculation.
It is the Twitter access log:
employee identity -> timestamp -> account -> data fields accessed -> communications immediately before and after the access.
Only then can the chain be reconstructed account by account.
14. The Saad Aljabri Case
In 2020, former Saudi intelligence official Saad Aljabri filed litigation in the United States containing allegations of an attempted assassination operation in Canada and naming Bader Al-Asaker among the defendants.
Al-Asaker has not been convicted of those allegations.
A significant procedural development occurred in 2024.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit preserved Mohammed bin Salman’s immunity but reversed dismissal as to Bader Al-Asaker and Saud Al-Qahtani for purposes of jurisdictional discovery, concluding that the lower court should have allowed discovery relevant to personal jurisdiction before resolving that question.
That decision did not establish the alleged assassination conspiracy.
It meant that the allegations and possible communications justified discovery on the jurisdictional issue.
The important question now is:
What will the communications and documents produced through that discovery show?
15. The Ghada Oueiss Case
Journalist Ghada Oueiss also filed U.S. federal litigation in 2020 naming Al-Asaker, Misk, Mohammed bin Salman, Saud Al-Qahtani and others in a case alleging hacking, dissemination of private material and harassment campaigns.
Al-Asaker moved to dismiss the case, and the litigation later reached the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Again:
Being named in a complaint does not establish the allegation.
But the recurrence of Al-Asaker’s name in separate litigation involving digital surveillance and influence makes the underlying documents worthy of examination rather than dismissal by assumption.
16. Jamal Khashoggi: What We Know and What We Do Not
After journalist Jamal Khashoggi was killed inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on October 2, 2018, Turkish newspaper Yeni Safak reported that Maher Abdulaziz Mutreb made four calls to Bader Al-Asaker or the Crown Prince’s office on the day of the killing.
Associated Press repeated the report while emphasizing an important limitation:
Yeni Safak did not disclose the source of that information.
This investigation therefore cannot state that the four calls have been established through original telecommunications records.
Nor can it state that Al-Asaker participated in Khashoggi’s killing.
It can ask a precise question:
Did Maher Mutreb call Bader Al-Asaker on October 2, 2018?
If so:
At what times?
For how long?
What was discussed?
And can the relevant call-detail records be released?
One authentic telecommunications record could resolve the factual question.
17. From Twitter to Money and Assets
At this point the investigation changes direction.
Research into financial and corporate relationships produced a Saudi company:
EIGHT INVESTMENT COMPANY.
We do not have only a name.
A Luxembourg corporate filing identifies the Saudi commercial registration number as:
1010413261.
Its historical address was recorded in Nakheel Quarter, Riyadh.
18. Prestigestate
Luxembourg company Prestigestate S.a r.l. carried registration number B136097.
On August 6, 2015:
Aida Shams Khashoggi
and
Adil Khashoggi
each transferred 200 shares to Eight Investment Company.
Eight therefore acquired all 400 shares of Prestigestate.
This is established by an official Luxembourg corporate filing.
A necessary clarification:
Aida and Adil Khashoggi in this transaction must not be confused with journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
The corporate transaction provides no basis for that conflation.
19. Bader Al-Asaker Appears in the Beneficial-Ownership Record
A Luxembourg beneficial-ownership declaration dated September 17, 2019 for Prestigestate identified three individuals:
Bader Mohammed A. Binasaker
Bader Ali A. Alkahail
Hazim Mostafa A. Zagzoog.
This is one of the most important documents in the investigation.
But it must be interpreted correctly.
It establishes that these individuals appeared as beneficial owners in the 2019 declaration.
It does not by itself establish that they were the beneficial owners in 2015.
It does not by itself establish each individual’s economic percentage.
It does not prove that each person contributed one-third of the purchase price of any asset.
The full RBE extract is therefore essential, particularly the nature of control and, if recorded, the date on which each beneficial interest began.
20. The Financial Question for Al-Asaker
The direct question is:
What was Bader Al-Asaker’s legal and economic interest in Prestigestate?
Was he:
an economic owner?
a nominee?
a trustee?
a control person?
a representative for another beneficiary?
an authorized representative?
The abbreviated record does not provide the complete answer.
The answer should come from Al-Asaker or from the complete beneficial-ownership record.
21. Chateau Louis XIV
Prestigestate was not an empty company without an identifiable asset network.
It forms part of the corporate structure associated with Chateau Louis XIV in Louveciennes, near Paris.
French corporate records show the property-holding structure later operating as SCI Arbre Prestige and then SNC Arbre Prestige, with Prestigestate and Eight Investment appearing in the partnership and management structure.
Press reporting estimated the 2015 Chateau transaction at approximately EUR 275 million.
Le Monde reported that documents supplied to authorities valued the SCI at approximately EUR 216 million.
The difference does not establish that EUR 59 million disappeared.
The figures may measure different concepts.
But they justify questions concerning:
purchase price;
enterprise value;
company valuation;
debt;
transaction expenses;
and the consideration actually paid to the sellers.
22. Fifty Five Investment Company
Le Monde reported another significant detail:
Funds for the Chateau transaction came from Fifty Five Investment Company.
That introduces a separate layer.
Eight appears in the ownership or acquisition structure.
But the funding, according to Le Monde, came from Fifty Five.
Was the money:
a loan?
a capital contribution?
a shareholder loan?
an intercompany transfer?
a direct payment to the seller or escrow?
We have not found a bank record that resolves this question.
23. Thamer Nassief
In 2015 another name appears:
Thamer Nabeel Nassief.
Le Monde described him in connection with a family-office environment associated with Mohammed bin Salman and reported his involvement in the Chateau acquisition.
French corporate records then show Nassief entering management of the company connected to the Chateau.
He therefore did not simply appear as a broker and disappear after the transaction.
He became part of the post-acquisition management structure.
24. Hans Cauchi
Hans Cauchi also appears in management of the French Chateau structure and remains visible in later corporate records.
The same name will then appear in South Africa.
That cross-jurisdiction recurrence makes his role important.
It does not, however, establish that Cauchi was the beneficial owner of the assets.
25. Eight Was Not Connected Only to the Chateau
Investigative reporting based on offshore leaks has associated Eight with other private assets linked in reporting to Mohammed bin Salman, including the luxury yacht Serene.
The distinction is critical:
Eight’s presence in a structure does not establish that Bader Al-Asaker personally purchased the yacht or the Chateau.
Nor does it establish that the assets were financed by the Public Investment Fund or by Saudi public money.
We found no evidence sufficient to make those claims.
The structures examined here appear more consistent with a private or family-office asset architecture than with a documented PIF investment structure.
26. Three Hundred and Fifty-Six Holding
Investigative and specialist investment sources describe a higher-level structure involving Three Hundred and Fifty-Six Holding Company and link it in reporting to entities including:
Eight Investment;
Fifty Five Investment;
Ninety Investment.
During this investigation, however, we did not obtain a complete primary Saudi corporate registry record proving the historical ownership percentages and complete chain among those companies.
The proposed chain:
356 -> Eight / Fifty Five / Ninety
must therefore remain a reported structure requiring primary Saudi registry confirmation.
The request to the Saudi Ministry of Commerce and the companies is straightforward:
Publish the historical corporate extracts.
27. The Power of Attorney We Need
A 2016 Luxembourg filing records Eight, as sole shareholder of Prestigestate, being represented before the notary by Anastasia Tylinski under a power of attorney executed under private seal.
The filing states that the power of attorney was attached to the original notarial instrument.
That document could answer a fundamental question:
Who had legal authority to bind Eight Investment Company?
Was it Al-Asaker?
Nassief?
Al-Kohail?
Zagzoog?
Someone else?
Rather than speculate, the underlying power of attorney should be obtained.
28. South Africa: Manupont 124
The investigation then moves to another continent.
Manupont 124 (Pty) Ltd owns or controls a network of land associated with the Ekland Safaris project in Limpopo, South Africa.
amaBhungane, which obtained Manupont’s shareholder register, reported that the previous shareholder was Euroamykasa.
In October 2015, the shares were transferred to Eight Investment.
The same Saudi Eight Investment Company had now appeared in South Africa.
29. Thamer Nassief Appears Again
When Eight entered Manupont, Thamer Nassief appeared as a director.
Hans Cauchi joined the board on January 1, 2016.
The pattern now existed in two jurisdictions:
France:
Eight / Prestigestate -> Nassief -> Cauchi.
South Africa:
Eight / Manupont -> Nassief -> Cauchi.
That is strong evidence of cross-border portfolio management.
It is not proof that Nassief or Cauchi were the ultimate economic owners.
30. Project Zebra
A South African government water study reveals an internal project name:
PROJECT ZEBRA.
The document describes Ekland as an existing private reserve and states that in 2017 the owner decided to upgrade and refurbish the facilities with the objective of creating world-class lodge facilities.
The year matters.
In 2017, Eight remained the shareholder of Manupont.
The major Project Zebra redevelopment decision therefore began during Eight’s ownership period.
31. The Scale of the Project
The original Project Zebra area included the Ekland Section and Lion Camp Section, covering approximately 14,000 hectares.
The project was then in the process of adding another approximately 14,000 hectares.
The intended footprint therefore approached:
28,000 hectares,
or approximately 280 square kilometres.
This was not a small lodge project.
32. Water
The government study recommended applying for a water allocation of:
0.6 million cubic metres per year.
The calculated demand at that stage was approximately:
0.27 million cubic metres per year.
That corresponds to approximately 600 million litres per year in requested capacity and approximately 270 million litres per year in calculated demand at that stage.
Those numbers provide another measure of the scale of the intended development.
33. Fleming Group
The same government document states that Core Groundwater Technical Services was appointed by Fleming Group on behalf of Manupont 124 (Pty) Ltd trading as Ekland Safaris.
Fleming therefore occupied a genuine project-management or representation layer in Project Zebra rather than appearing merely in an employee biography.
34. A Project Reported at Approximately R2 Billion
A professional profile of a former Fleming employee described the Ekland redevelopment as an approximately R2 billion project.
That figure comes from a professional self-description rather than audited financial statements.
It therefore cannot yet be treated as an established project cost.
It should be described as a reported project scale requiring financial verification.
The obvious question is:
Who financed it?
35. February 2019: Eight Disappears from the Shareholder Register
A striking change occurred in early 2019.
amaBhungane journalists sought access to Manupont’s shareholder register.
A dispute arose over access.
A sheriff became involved in the effort to enforce access to the register.
Four days later, on February 24, 2019, the entire ownership of Manupont was transferred from:
Eight Investment
to:
Willow Ltd,
a Cayman Islands company.
The timing is established.
The reason for the transfer is not.
This investigation cannot state that the transfer was made to conceal ownership.
It can ask:
Why did the transfer occur at that time?
36. Willow: The Black Box
Graham Moon, the project manager, told investigators that Willow was a Cayman company created to hold investments globally.
amaBhungane confirmed that the company was registered in the Cayman Islands but could not identify the beneficial owner.
By the end of our research we had not obtained:
the Cayman company number;
registered agent;
directors;
shareholders;
or UBO.
Willow therefore remains the most opaque link in the South African chain.
37. Did the Economic Owner Actually Change?
We do not know.
What we do know is that the Eight-to-Willow transfer did not end the project.
Hans Cauchi remained a director.
Graham Moon remained involved in the project.
Development continued.
At approximately the same time, Nassief left and another Saudi, Yazeed Mohammed Alsaeed, entered the management structure.
That establishes operational continuity.
It does not establish continuity of ultimate ownership.
The question that matters is:
Did Willow pay Eight genuine consideration for Manupont?
If so:
How much?
And from which account?
38. Yazeed Mohammed Alsaeed
amaBhungane was unable to establish Alsaeed’s identity conclusively.
Its research found a professional with a matching or similar name and a background involving legal work, Saudi government entities and private equity, but did not prove that he was the same person.
We therefore do not merge those identities.
Manupont should answer a simple question:
Who is the Yazeed Mohammed Alsaeed who became a director in February 2019?
And what was his relationship with:
Eight;
Willow;
the private office;
or 356?
39. Salicar Imberbe
Only weeks after Manupont was transferred to Willow, a South African company numbered K2019183489 appeared.
It later became known as Salicar Imberbe.
By June 2019 it appeared in licensing applications associated with Ekland hospitality facilities.
Graham Andrew Moon also appeared in its management.
This is further evidence that the operating architecture around Ekland was reorganized after the ownership transfer.
It is not evidence that Willow owned Salicar.
40. The Salicar Cluster
Salicar Imberbe did not appear alone.
On April 16, 2019, several Salicar companies were incorporated, including:
Salicar Imberbe;
Salicar Digital;
Salicar Holdings.
Graham Andrew Moon and John Andries Cass recur in the cluster, together with a shared Waterkloof address.
But Salicar Venture Capital is much older, dating to 2006.
Salicar was therefore not invented because of Ekland.
A pre-existing investment name or platform appears to have expanded in 2019.
Who financed that expansion and who economically owned the companies requires the complete corporate records.
41. The Environmental Failure
One of the clearest regulatory events in the project concerns South Africa’s Section 24G process.
Ekland entered a Section 24G environmental rectification procedure.
Section 24G is used to address listed activities that commenced before the required prior environmental authorization had been obtained.
The Ekland matter carried reference:
12/1/9/S24G-V33.
The environmental authorization was issued on November 11, 2020.
Public reporting of an official meeting recorded a LEDET representative confirming that development had occurred before the required approval and stating that a fine of approximately:
R2.5 million
had been imposed and paid.
This is not an allegation that Bader Al-Asaker personally ordered the works.
We have no evidence establishing that.
It is, however, a documented regulatory failure inside a development whose major redevelopment decision began during Eight’s ownership period.
42. The Private Airstrip and Facilities
Planning and project records show a broad development program involving:
lodges;
executive accommodation;
staff housing;
fencing;
support infrastructure;
and a private airstrip.
Project Zebra also included studies relating to upgrading an existing runway and aviation infrastructure.
This was not simply a small hunting farm.
It was a substantial private development requiring financing, management and multiple regulatory approvals.
The financial question remains:
Who was paying?
43. Euroamykasa: The Story Predates Eight
Before Eight, Manupont’s shareholder was Euroamykasa, associated with businessman Mohamed Eyad Kayali.
Manupont records reviewed by investigators showed Kayali and his son serving as directors before Nassief entered.
But the Panama Papers produced an older thread:
Almack Properties.
Kayali appeared with powers of attorney or roles in offshore structures associated in reporting with assets linked to members of the Saudi royal family.
Records reviewed by amaBhungane indicated that Almack had held Manupont at an earlier stage before the interest moved to Euroamykasa in 2001 for approximately $2 million.
Ekland’s Saudi-linked history may therefore predate Eight by many years.
44. A Chain Spanning Approximately Two Decades
The possible sequence becomes:
Almack Properties
-> Euroamykasa / Kayali
-> Eight Investment
-> Willow Ltd.
But we do not yet have evidence establishing that the same ultimate beneficial owner remained behind the asset through every stage.
That is the question.
Were these genuine sales among independent owners?
Or were some of them successive restructurings of an asset remaining inside one economic circle or related circles?
The consideration, signatures and beneficial ownership at each stage are what will answer the question.
45. What Does All of This Have to Do with Bader Al-Asaker?
This requires the highest level of precision.
We do not have evidence saying:
Bader Al-Asaker personally owned Ekland.
We do not have evidence saying:
Bader Al-Asaker personally purchased Chateau Louis XIV.
We do not have evidence saying:
Bader Al-Asaker personally paid EUR 275 million.
We do not have evidence saying:
Bader Al-Asaker financed Project Zebra.
What we do have is different and important:
His name appears in 2019 in the beneficial-ownership record of Prestigestate, part of the Eight-linked structure associated with the Chateau.
At the same time, he occupied one of the most sensitive positions in the Crown Prince’s private circle.
The proper question is therefore not:
Why did Al-Asaker buy the Chateau?
It is:
What precisely was Bader Al-Asaker’s legal, fiduciary and economic relationship with Eight Investment Company, Prestigestate, Three Hundred and Fifty-Six Holding Company, Fifty Five Investment Company and the assets administered through those structures?
46. The Network of Individuals
The documents suggest a possible functional division.
At the ownership or control layer:
Bader Al-Asaker;
Bader Al-Kohail;
Hazim Zagzoog
appeared in the 2019 Prestigestate beneficial-ownership record.
At the international management layer:
Thamer Nassief;
Hans Cauchi.
In South Africa:
Graham Moon;
then Yazeed Mohammed Alsaeed.
In the later operating structure:
Salicar and John Cass.
This is an analytical model.
It is not a fully proven ownership chain.
47. The Corporate Network
The corporate network requiring complete records includes:
Three Hundred and Fifty-Six Holding Company;
Eight Investment Company – CR 1010413261;
Fifty Five Investment Company;
Ninety Investment Company;
Prestigestate S.a r.l. – B136097;
SNC Arbre Prestige – SIREN 502738925;
Manupont 124;
Willow Ltd;
Salicar Venture Capital;
Salicar Holdings;
Salicar Imberbe;
Salicar Digital.
Each company must be treated separately.
Its presence in the network does not automatically make all of its assets or money the property of the same individual.
48. The Most Important Financial Question: Private or Public?
The materials reviewed do not establish that:
PIF financed Chateau Louis XIV;
PIF financed Serene;
or PIF financed Ekland.
Nor do we have evidence that Saudi treasury funds financed these assets.
They therefore cannot responsibly be described as stolen public money on the present record.
But where companies intersect with individuals holding senior governmental positions, the boundary between:
public authority
and
private wealth management
deserves transparency.
Who owned the companies?
Who paid the managers?
Who signed the powers of attorney?
Who financed the acquisitions?
And who was the ultimate economic beneficiary?
49. 95 KLEBER: A Separate Family Structure
A separate French entity also appeared:
95 KLEBER SCI.
It is directly associated in French corporate records with Bader Al-Asaker and family-associated names.
But we found no evidence permitting it to be automatically merged with Eight or Prestigestate.
It should remain a separate investigative track unless a:
shareholding;
loan;
transaction;
common power of attorney;
or financial transfer
connects it to the larger network.
50. Salvator Mundi: A Necessary Correction
Some reporting around Saudi offshore structures can create confusion involving the painting Salvator Mundi.
The buyer publicly associated with the transaction was:
Prince Bader bin Abdullah bin Mohammed bin Farhan Al Saud.
He is a different person from:
Bader Al-Asaker.
Salvator Mundi therefore cannot be used as evidence that Al-Asaker personally purchased the painting.
51. What Has Actually Been Established?
It has been established that Bader Al-Asaker was officially appointed Director of the Crown Prince’s Private Office for Private Affairs at ministerial rank.
It has been established that he served as secretary-general of Misk and operated in its programs.
His relationship with Ahmad Abouammo is established in the U.S. criminal record.
The Hublot watch from Al-Asaker to Abouammo is established in that record.
Three payments totaling $300,000 from Al-Asaker to Abouammo appear in the U.S. evidentiary record.
Abouammo’s conviction in the Twitter-related foreign-agent, fraud, money-laundering and obstruction-related case is established.
Al-Asaker’s A-2 visa application described him as working for the government and Royal Court, and the Ninth Circuit found the evidence sufficient for the jury’s relevant conclusion regarding official status.
Eight Investment’s Saudi commercial registration number 1010413261 is identified in Luxembourg records.
Eight’s acquisition of all Prestigestate shares in August 2015 is established by Luxembourg corporate filings.
Bader Al-Asaker, Bader Al-Kohail and Hazim Zagzoog appeared as Prestigestate beneficial owners in a 2019 declaration.
Eight and Prestigestate appear in the French corporate structure associated with Chateau Louis XIV.
Manupont moved from Euroamykasa to Eight and later from Eight to Willow.
Cauchi, Moon and the project continued after Willow entered.
Project Zebra’s major redevelopment decision began in 2017 while Eight held Manupont.
And Ekland underwent a Section 24G process after activities commenced before the required environmental authorization.
52. What Has Not Been Established?
It has not been established that Al-Asaker was convicted in the Twitter case.
It has not been established that he personally ordered every account access.
It has not been established that he personally caused Abdulrahman Al-Sadhan’s arrest.
It has not been established that he participated in Jamal Khashoggi’s killing.
The reported four calls have not been established through an original telecommunications record reviewed by us.
It has not been established that Al-Asaker personally owned the Chateau.
It has not been established that he personally owned Ekland.
It has not been established that PIF financed these assets.
It has not been established that Saudi public money financed them.
It has not been established that Willow had the same ultimate economic owner as Eight.
It has not been established that the Eight-to-Willow transfer was intended to conceal ownership.
And the complete 356 -> Eight / Fifty Five / Ninety structure has not yet been established through a complete primary Saudi registry record.
53. Questions Bader Al-Asaker Should Answer
After reviewing these documents, further speculation is unnecessary.
Answers are required.
What was your legal and economic relationship with Eight Investment Company?
Were you a shareholder? If so, at what percentage and during what period?
Why were you identified as a beneficial owner of Prestigestate in 2019?
What was the nature of the beneficial interest registered in your name?
Who was the ultimate beneficial owner of Prestigestate in August 2015?
Were you acting as a nominee, fiduciary or representative for another person?
What was your relationship with Three Hundred and Fifty-Six Holding Company?
What was your relationship with Fifty Five Investment Company?
What was your relationship with Ninety Investment Company?
Who signed the power of attorney used by Eight before the Luxembourg notary?
Who financed Chateau Louis XIV?
What was the legal nature of the funds supplied by Fifty Five for the transaction?
Were they a loan, equity or shareholder funding?
Who had final decision-making authority within Eight?
Who paid Thamer Nassief?
What was Nassief’s relationship with the Crown Prince’s private office?
Who appointed Hans Cauchi to manage the assets?
54. Questions About Twitter
Why did Ahmad Abouammo receive a Hublot watch from you?
What was the purpose of the three $100,000 payments?
From which account did they originate?
Why did the first two payments reach a Lebanese account in Abouammo’s father’s name?
What services did you believe you were paying for?
Did you request information concerning @mujtahidd?
What information did you request?
Did you receive nonpublic information concerning Twitter users?
Who introduced Ahmed Almutairi and Ali Alzabarah to one another or to you?
Who hired Alzabarah at Misk?
Did Misk know when hiring him that Twitter had investigated his access to user information?
55. Questions About Al-Sadhan
Did you receive any information identifying the person operating @Sama7ti?
Did you send or receive any list of anonymous Saudi Twitter accounts?
Was Omar Abdulaziz included on any such list?
Did you provide Twitter information to any Saudi government body?
Can you release communications concerning the accounts at issue, subject to lawful redactions protecting innocent users?
56. Questions About Khashoggi
Did Maher Abdulaziz Mutreb call you on October 2, 2018?
If so:
How many times?
At what times?
How long did the calls last?
What was discussed?
Can the relevant call-detail records be released?
The 2018 report concerning four calls remains a press report whose original source was not disclosed publicly.
57. Questions About Ekland
Who approved Manupont’s acquisition by Eight in 2015?
How much did Eight pay Euroamykasa?
Who signed the share transfer?
Who approved Project Zebra in 2017?
What was the original capital budget?
Who financed it?
Was the financing structured as shareholder loans?
Did Fifty Five, 356 or another Saudi company provide financing?
Why was Manupont transferred from Eight to Willow on February 24, 2019?
How much did Willow pay?
Who owns Willow?
Why did Hans Cauchi remain?
Who appointed Yazeed Mohammed Alsaeed?
Did any debt or shareholder loan owed to Eight remain after the transfer?
58. Questions About Section 24G
Who decided to commence works before the required environmental authorization had been completed?
What works had begun?
What was their value?
Who was the contractor?
Who approved the payments?
Was the shareholder at the relevant time Eight or Willow?
Who paid the approximately R2.5 million fine reported by the LEDET representative?
Were there any other regulatory violations connected to the project?
59. Questions for the Saudi Public Are Not Accusations
If all of these structures represent entirely lawful management of private assets, why not publish the ownership structures and sources of financing?
If Bader Al-Asaker was merely a representative or fiduciary, who was the ultimate economic beneficiary?
If Eight was a family-office vehicle, why did three natural persons appear in Prestigestate’s beneficial-ownership register?
If those names represented genuine economic ownership, what were the sources of their capital?
If they represented control persons rather than economic owners, whom did they represent?
If Willow was a genuinely independent new owner, who owns it and how much did it pay Eight?
If it was not independent, why was the legal ownership layer changed?
And if all of the money involved was legitimate private wealth, what prevents the relevant owners from documenting that?
These are not answers.
They are questions the public record still cannot resolve.
Conclusion
Bader Al-Asaker is not a marginal name in contemporary Saudi power.
A royal order formally placed him inside the Crown Prince’s private office at ministerial rank.
The U.S. criminal record placed his name at the center of a financial relationship with a Twitter employee later convicted in a case involving confidential user information and work on behalf of Saudi Arabia.
Luxembourg documents placed his name in the beneficial-ownership record of a company inside the Eight Investment structure.
That network leads into corporate and asset structures extending from France and Luxembourg to South Africa and the Cayman Islands.
But this investigation does not need to invent a crime to be important.
The real problem is the gaps.
Who paid?
Who owned?
Who represented whom?
Who signed?
Who gave the instructions?
Who was the ultimate beneficiary?
Why did some assets move between different corporate vehicles while managers and projects remained?
And where was the boundary between governmental authority, private affairs and private wealth management?
The documents reviewed provide many pieces of the picture.
They do not provide the complete picture.
For that reason, the unproven part of this investigation is not presented as a verdict against Bader Al-Asaker.
It is an open question.
To Bader Al-Asaker.
To the relevant Saudi institutions.
And to the Saudi public, which has the right to ask how networks of power and money surrounding the highest levels of government operate.
THE DEEP FILES will correct any documented error in this investigation and will add any substantive response received from Bader Al-Asaker or any person or entity named in it, identifying when the response was received.
Selected Source Record
The following sources are among the principal public records used to anchor the investigation. URLs are included in plain English form for editorial verification.
Saudi Press Agency – Royal Order A/305 (2017): https://www.spa.gov.sa/1649683
U.S. Department of Justice – United States v. Ahmad Abouammo case page: https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/united-states-v-ahmad-abouammo
U.S. Department of Justice – 2026 Supreme Court brief: https://www.justice.gov/d9/2026-03/25-5146bsunitedstates.pdf
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit – United States v. Abouammo: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/12/04/22-10348.pdf
Luxembourg Memorial – Prestigestate / Eight Investment filing (2015): https://memorialc.public.lu/memorial/2015/C/Pdf/c304806B.pdf
Luxembourg Memorial – Prestigestate / Eight Investment filing (2016): https://memorialc.public.lu/memorial/2016/C/Pdf/c2006087.pdf
Dataharvest / OpenLux – Luxembourg beneficial ownership material: https://dataharvest.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Dataharvest-OpenLux-presentation.pdf
Le Monde – Chateau Louis XIV investigation: https://www.lemonde.fr/m-actu/article/2018/02/09/a-louveciennes-la-folle-histoire-du-chateau-louis-xiv_5254367_4497186.html
French corporate record – Arbre Prestige: https://entreprises.lefigaro.fr/snc-arbre-prestige-78/entreprise-502738925
amaBhungane – Ekland / Eight / Manupont investigation: https://amabhungane.org/how-a-south-african-hunting-resort-opened-a-window-to-saudi-crown-princes-business-empire/
South African Department of Water and Sanitation – Project Zebra groundwater study: https://www.dws.gov.za/ghreport/reports/2.2%285611%29.pdf
Daily Maverick – Section 24G / Ekland reporting: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-05-25-killing-the-holy-ghost-inside-the-unlawful-bid-for-environmental-approval-of-the-musina-makhado-sez/
D.C. Circuit – Aljabri appellate decision: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-7150/22-7150-2024-07-09.html
Associated Press / MPR – Khashoggi call-report context: https://www.mprnews.org/story/2018/10/22/in-khashoggi-case-saudi-calls-body-double-after-killing
