Wasting the Saudi people’s money
An investigative dossier on origins, McKinsey scenarios, connected companies, funding and disclosure gaps |
Is public money available to satisfy private interests?
That question frames this inquiry; it is not its verdict. Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) committed billions of dollars to LIV Golf. The public record identifies the funder, the strategic consultancy, the operator, several suppliers and related sponsors, yet does not disclose a complete transaction-level ledger or the investment committee’s full decision record. A costly or controversial investment is not, by itself, theft. The test is who authorized each payment, what service or asset was received, whether relationships were disclosed, and whether decision-makers saw the downside alongside the upside.
Executive findings
- The earliest independently documented rival league idea predates LIV: Andy Gardiner publicly described the Premier Golf League (PGL) and possible PIF involvement in February 2020. A 2026 claimant alleges a more detailed 2018–21 history, including direct engagement with Yasir Al-Rumayyan; those allegations have not been adjudicated. [1][2]
- McKinsey’s 2021 Project Wedge material reportedly modeled sharply divergent outcomes: in a favorable 2028 case revenue of at least $1.4 billion and operating profit of at least $320 million, and in a startup case an operating loss of $355 million. The key unverified question is what version, caveats and downside were presented to the PIF decision body. [3][4][5]
- 54 (formerly Performance54) says it advised on deal sourcing, due diligence, investor relations, financial and operating models, hiring, contract negotiation and events. A transaction adviser confirms investment in Performance54 by Sanabil, a PIF portfolio company. This creates a concrete connected-party procurement question, not proof of an improper payment. [6][10]
- A September 2026 court declaration puts PIF equity investment at about $5 billion, gives Performance54 approximately 1.05% of common equity, describes a $495 million secured financing and identifies approximately 40 bank accounts. It does not publish a full payee-by-payee accounting of those billions. [11]
- Reported additional funding approval on 1 February 2026 is approximately $266.6 million. The underlying signed request, approval trail, disbursement evidence and complete use-of-proceeds schedule have not been made public in the materials examined. It is therefore inaccurate to describe a located “1 February memo” or to equate an approval automatically with cash paid. [15][16]
Method and evidentiary boundaries
This dossier separates corporate and court documents, first-person company statements, reporting based on confidential records, and allegations in litigation. Its figures have different accounting bases: equity contributions, borrowing, committed future spending, annual revenue, operating profit or loss, supplier revenue and unpaid invoices. They must not be added into one missing-money figure. The “every cent” test requires general ledgers, bank statements, invoices, beneficial ownership and board papers that are not publicly available. No examined document establishes embezzlement, a transfer to an unidentified ultimate beneficiary, or deliberate concealment by McKinsey.
1. Origins: who proposed the league?
Gardiner’s contemporaneous February 2020 interview discussed the PGL and PIF among prospective partners. It proves that a competing global-league proposal and Saudi interest were public before LIV’s launch, though it does not prove who personally pitched Al-Rumayyan first. [2]
World Golf Group/PGL claimants later sued in Britain. According to a report that reviewed the complaint, their chronology starts with Gardiner’s concept in summer 2009, a 2018 group of founders, an August 2018 Raine financing approach, a 13 November 2019 term sheet contemplating $1 billion for a 40% PGL stake and PIF financing of $490 million through a related structure, and a subsequent nonbinding letter of intent reportedly involving Al-Rumayyan. They allege terms and ownership shifted in 2020–21, and claim breach of confidence and related wrongs. Defendants have not been found liable on those claims. Each purported offer must be verified against the original signed instrument, ownership chain and communications. [1]
The earliest pitch to Al-Rumayyan remains unidentified in the accessible primary documents. The decisive sequence would include the first dated proposal addressed to him; delivery receipts; PIF, Golf Saudi and Raine correspondence; the PGL presentations and access logs; the mandate for Project Wedge; and the first LIV investment request. Similarity of concepts and overlapping advisers alone cannot prove misappropriation.
2. The McKinsey decision path
Reporting on Project Wedge describes three trajectories, commonly labeled nascent, coexistence and dominance, conditioned on acquiring elite players, broadcast distribution, sponsors and reactions from incumbent golf institutions. Published accounts identify a favorable 2028 case with $1.4 billion or more of revenue and $320 million or more operating profit, beside a nascent 2028 case with $355 million operating loss. These are scenarios, not audited forecasts or amounts paid. Reporting also says McKinsey’s work did not itself assess overall strategic viability and relied on client-supplied assumptions. Original decks and full engagement terms have not been obtained. [3][4]
The U.S. Senate formally sought McKinsey’s scope, people and Project Wedge records in August 2023. That request shows scrutiny of the assignment; it does not prove that McKinsey recommended approval, concealed a downside or controlled the PIF’s investment decision. [5]
A precise documentary test for possible decision distortion is to compare the complete working model and appendices with the dated final committee pack, the presentation actually circulated, attendance and minutes, the approval resolution, and later revisions. Check whether the $1.4 billion and $320 million numbers appeared without their player-acquisition and market-share assumptions; whether the $355 million loss case was present, prominent and understood; and whether fees or incentives tied to a go-ahead created a conflict. No available record resolves these questions. An incomplete board presentation could have been assembled by someone other than McKinsey; authorship must be traced before attribution.
3. The connected-company network
| Entity or person | Verified connection | Question raised |
| PIF / Al-Rumayyan | PIF supplied capital; Al-Rumayyan held senior PIF/LIV decision roles. [11] | What did he approve, see and disclose? |
| McKinsey | Reported author of 2021 Project Wedge scenarios; Senate requested records. [3][5] | Mandate, assumptions, full circulation list and fees? |
| 54 / Performance54 | Company claims broad LIV advisory and delivery role; court discloses equity. [6][11] | Tender, fees, scope, subcontractors and conflicts? |
| Sanabil | Transaction adviser confirms investment in Performance54. [10] | Acquisition price, ownership at each date, recusal? |
| Golf Saudi / BCG | 54 executive describes 2018 Saudi Golf Federation bid and work with BCG on golf framework. [7] | Where did early strategy end and LIV mandate begin? |
| ROSHN / Riyadh Air | Listed among LIV partners; ROSHN publicized multiyear partnership. [13][14] | Cash, in-kind consideration and related-party valuation? |
| PGL / Raine | Pre-LIV proposal and disputed financing chronology. [1][2] | Who had access to which confidential materials? |
The UK company LIV Golf Ltd was initially registered under the name PERFORMANCE54I (UK) LTD in June 2021. A Jersey entity later named LIV Golf Investments Ltd previously bore a Performance54i name. The shared branding is a lead for reviewing incorporation instructions and beneficial ownership; a former company name does not establish that the consultancy owned LIV. Jersey authorities recorded administration of that entity in September 2026. [8][9]
A 54 executive described winning a competitive Saudi Golf Federation bid in 2018 and working with Boston Consulting Group on the broader golf framework. This should not be collapsed into McKinsey’s later LIV scenario assignment. 54’s own case study lists deal sourcing, due diligence, investor relations, modeling, hiring, contract negotiation and event operations. “$2 billion investment stewardship,” a company description, cannot be counted as a $2 billion payment to 54. [6][7]
Sanabil’s acquisition of an interest in Performance54 was confirmed by the deal adviser, but the disclosed transaction notice does not state price. Secondary reporting cites a historical 5,001/10,001-share position; it is neither a current ownership certificate nor proof of a specific LIV fee’s ultimate destination. Time-stamped share registers, acquisition documents and dividends are needed. [7][10]
4. Tracing the money without inventing missing funds
| Publicly reported item | Basis and limitation |
| Approximately $5 billion | PIF equity contributions per September 2026 court declaration; approximation, not a transaction ledger. [11] |
| $495 million | Secured financing described in court; debt is not additional PIF equity. [11] |
| $15 million | Approximate petition-date cash reported in the same case; snapshot, not money lost. [11] |
| $102 million | 2025 sponsorship revenue, reported as 49% of revenue; implied total about $208 million subject to rounding. [11] |
| $300 million | Future 2027–29 contracted sponsorship claimed in court; not collected cash. [11] |
| $102 million | Performance54 2023 fees reported by Reuters; check original entity accounts and contract scope. [12] |
| About $266.6 million | Reported 1 February 2026 funding approval; approval and actual cash movement are distinct. [15] |
The 2026 first-day declaration states roughly $3 billion of U.S. net operating losses and $2 billion of U.K. net operating losses. Tax-loss carryforwards are not cash, cannot simply be added to the investment outlay, and depend on tax rules and entity-specific records. It also reports sponsorship 49% of 2025 revenue, host fees 22%, tickets 16%, broadcast 5%, merchandise 5% and other 3%. Commercial dependence on affiliates requires separate disclosure of pricing and ultimate funding. [11]
The same court materials report approximately 40 bank accounts at JPMorgan and Barclays. This is a map of accounts, not evidence of hidden accounts. Its next evidentiary step is an account-by-account opening balance, transfer counterparties, closing balance and reconciliation to the entity trial balances. A list of major creditors is a snapshot of amounts outstanding, never a history of all payments to those payees. [11]
Secondary accounts suggest supplier fees around $59 million in 2022, $102 million in 2023 and about $287 million across 2022–24 for Performance54; Reuters corroborates the 2023 figure, while the three-year sum needs verification against source financial statements and scope across entities. Do not compare a calendar-year LIV expense directly with a Performance54 group’s April fiscal-year turnover: 54 has other clients and intercompany eliminations may apply. [12][19]
ROSHN and Riyadh Air appear on LIV’s partner list, and ROSHN calls itself a major partner. Public materials do not identify each related sponsor’s consideration, funds source or fair-market pricing. A related PIF company purchasing advertising from a PIF-backed league can be commercially legitimate; identify the signatories, services, valuation and payments before asserting round-tripping or subsidy concealment. [13][14]
A specialist publication reports Al-Rumayyan approval of approximately $266.6 million on 1 February 2026 and later additional support; neither the actual funding request nor a signed approval memorandum was independently obtained. Another account cites further financing later in the year. Date-stamp each corporate approval, loan agreement, remittance and conversion; do not add successive press figures to the court’s approximate $5 billion without matching the period and instrument. [15][16]
Performance54’s UK Companies House charge register records Lloyds security instruments in January 2026. The registered charge is evidence of a security filing; it does not disclose the amount advanced or establish that LIV receivables secure that debt. The actual instrument and schedules are necessary. [17]
5. Incentives, oversight and cross-border exposure
54’s combination of advisory work, contract negotiation, delivery and equity participation heightens the importance of testing independence, recusal, procurement competition and whether a supplier could influence its own scope or compensation. The court filing attributes about 1.05% common equity to Performance54, about 98.48% to PIF and smaller fractions to named management/player interests. Ownership does not establish wrongdoing; examine vesting terms, consideration, dilution and beneficial owners. [6][11]
The structure spans Saudi public-investment institutions, UK operating and supplier companies, a Jersey holding company, U.S. courts and bank accounts, and international tournaments and sponsorship. Each jurisdiction provides a fragment of the picture. Reconstruct the actual contracting entity in each period; subsidiaries with similar names must not be treated as one wallet.
A 2023 Senate staff memorandum addressed proposed terms around PGA Tour–PIF negotiations, including a reported draft governance side letter concerning management and Performance54. A proposal or draft is not an executed termination agreement. Determine which provisions were signed, superseded or abandoned before attaching consequences. [18]
6. Priority disclosure gaps and how to close them
| Gap | Document or test that would resolve it |
| First approach to Al-Rumayyan | Original dated PGL/PIF correspondence and deck metadata; delivery and access records. |
| Project Wedge’s decision effect | Engagement contract; complete model and downside appendix; final board pack and minutes. |
| 1 February 2026 funding request | Original request, signed approval, bank advice, restricted-use schedule and variance report. |
| Performance54 ultimate benefits | All contracts, annual invoices, subcontractor ledger, share register, dividends and related-party disclosures. |
| Related sponsor circularity | ROSHN/Riyadh Air contracts, valuations, bank wires and underlying budget approvals. |
| Five-billion reconciliation | PIF capital-call ledger matched to each recipient bank account, use-of-funds ledger and audited statements. |
| Unidentified counterparties | General-ledger vendor master, beneficial ownership documents, bank-payee details and sanctions/PEP review. |
Specific red flags worth testing are noncompetitive or retroactive supplier appointments, scope overlap between adviser and beneficiary, management equity acquired for unclear consideration, presentation of optimistic cases without qualifying assumptions, unexplained sponsor payments between affiliates, and material payments to unidentified subcontractors. These are investigative hypotheses, not findings of a crime. Conversely, the presence of a known intermediary or a difference between figures measured on different dates does not identify a missing recipient.
Finding and right-of-reply protocol
No reviewed public source proves that McKinsey deliberately induced a loss-making approval, that Al-Rumayyan diverted PIF funds, or that an identified payment went to a concealed ultimate beneficiary. The current finding is a consequential disclosure gap concerning the investment rationale, supplier economics, connected-party interests and cash reconciliation. Before publishing allegations about named people, request the contracts and decision documents, seek a dated response from PIF, McKinsey, 54, Sanabil, LIV and PGL claimants, and append their substantive corrections. The companion questions document is designed for that purpose.
7. Expanded chronology of the competing projects
| Date | Event, status and missing document |
| 2009–2016 | According to the 2026 PGL/WGG complaint as described by reporters, Andy Gardiner conceived an international league around 2009, later formed Mayen Limited and engaged Richard Marsh as a consultant. A litigant’s retrospective date is not independently authenticated by a dated 2009 deck. Seek incorporation records and archived files. [1] |
| 2018 | The claimants say a founder group assembled WGG and sought financing through the Raine Group. Separately, 54’s executive says his organization won a competitive Saudi Golf Federation assignment and worked on a Saudi golf framework with BCG. Those are potentially converging streams, but do not assume a common project or unauthorized sharing without the signed mandates. [1][7] |
| 2019 | A reported November term sheet involved Raine, the PGL, PIF-linked financing and a minority economic interest. Claimed late-2019 direct engagement with Al-Rumayyan must be checked against the purported nonbinding letter of intent, names of all recipients and access controls. [1] |
| January–February 2020 | A complaint filed by LIV players in 2022 itself described PGL as a venture involving Raine Investor Group SPV, World Golf Group, PIF and Performance54, and said PGL approached player representatives and offered contracts by January 2020. This is an important contemporaneous-in-litigation admission by plaintiffs, but its factual propositions remain pleadings. Gardiner discussed PIF interest publicly in February 2020. [2][23] |
| 2020–May 2021 | WGG alleges dilution of its role, unsuccessful buyout bargaining and a transfer of know-how while certain individuals moved toward a Saudi-backed alternative. Richard Marsh’s reported move to Saudi golf work in May 2021 needs a dated contract and exact job description. [1] |
| June 2021–March 2022 | US, UK and Jersey entities were formed beginning June 2021; the debtor declaration says operations launched March 2022. Company names and incorporation dates must be matched individually against consultant work, the McKinsey mandate and the PGL negotiations. [8][9][11] |
| 2022–2024 | The league recruited athletes using guarantees and commercial-rights payments alongside prize purses. The June 2023 proposed framework with PGA Tour prompted congressional scrutiny. Both competition and settlement claims require contract-level verification. [11][18] |
| 2025–September 2026 | The league changed to 72 holes late 2025 according to its restructuring officer. In April 2026 PIF announced no further equity infusions while agreeing to finance the remainder of the season through secured lending. A US Chapter 11 filing followed on 8 September. [11][21] |
8. People register: actual roles and precise questions
| Person | Documented or reported role | What remains unresolved |
| Yasir Al-Rumayyan | PIF governor and central public decision-maker in the inquiry; reported participant in PGL engagement. | Identify earliest personal briefing, approval powers, conflicts register and full committee materials. No personal diversion is established. [1][11] |
| Andy Gardiner | PGL concept promoter and WGG-linked claimant. | Identify first pitch, origin files and signed confidentiality agreements. His origin claim is contested. [1][2] |
| Richard Marsh | Reported WGG founder/consultant later associated with Saudi initiative; named defendant in PGL claim. | Establish exact dates of service, fiduciary obligations and materials accessed; allegation is unresolved. [1] |
| Jed Moore | WGG-associated founder named in PGL litigation. | Reconstruct employment and fiduciary timeline and content of communications. [1] |
| Colin Neville | Raine partner identified in reporting around PGL fundraising. | Produce mandate and negotiating file; verify entity and economic rights before attributing decisions. [1] |
| Majed Al-Sorour | Golf Saudi leader associated with early PGL conversations and LIV launch-era management in public reporting. | Identify agency and reporting line for each meeting, investment request and player negotiation. [1] |
| Greg Norman | LIV launch-era chief executive and commissioner. | Identify recruitment authorizations, compensation and timing of mandates. Not established as sole inventor of concept. [11] |
| Scott O’Neil | LIV chief executive during 2026 restructuring. | Provide cash runway, alternatives, RSA negotiation record and player-obligation schedule. [22] |
| David Orlofsky | AlixPartners partner and chief restructuring officer appointed September 2026; signed debtor declaration. | Reconcile declaration estimates to schedules and claims; distinction between management representations and audit. [11][21] |
| Gene Davis | Independent director and special-committee chair named in September 2026 record. | Provide appointment mandate, adviser conflicts, sale-process alternatives and minutes. [11][22] |
| Jon Zinman | Independent director appointed for restructuring. | Provide independence disclosures, recusal history and restructuring votes. [11] |
| Bradley Robins | Declarant named in court material concerning DIP funding. | Identify bids for post-petition financing and assumptions behind “only viable option.” [11] |
| Phil Mickelson | High-profile early LIV participant and named plaintiff in 2022 antitrust case. | Separate rumored signing figures from executed contract and actual remittances. [23] |
| Jon Rahm | Player creditor in September 2026 petition. | $7,472,527.47 recorded unsecured claim; not total compensation. [21] |
| Bryson DeChambeau | Player creditor. | $5,769,230.77 claim marked contingent; confirm maturity and setoff. [21] |
| Dustin Johnson | Player creditor. | $5,489,010.99 claim marked contingent, unliquidated or disputed; confirm actual allowed amount. [21] |
| Cameron Smith | Player creditor. | $4,835,164.84 unsecured claim as listed. [21] |
| Tyrrell Hatton | Player creditor. | $3,373,626.37 petition amount; verify creditor entity spelling in source. [21] |
| Brooks Koepka | Player creditor on petition. | $1,681,278.54 listed despite subsequent playing-status changes. [21] |
| Talor Gooch, Hudson Swafford, Matt Jones | Names previously surfaced in specific 2022 LIV player-contract research. | Obtain dated original agreements, redacted payment terms and amendments before asserting paid amount. [11] |
| Gary Davidson | 54 executive interviewed about early Saudi golf strategy. | Identify roles, mandates and client entity; a company statement is interested testimony. [7] |
| Richard Blumenthal | US senator whose subcommittee sought consulting records. | A document request is scrutiny, not a finding of fraud. [5] |
| Jay Monahan | PGA Tour commissioner named in the 2022 LIV players’ complaint. | The complaint’s account of his response to PGL represents plaintiffs’ allegations. [23] |
9. Company and intermediary register
| Organization | Identified function | Evidence to obtain |
| Public Investment Fund | Saudi sovereign wealth fund; ultimate LIV equity funder and proposed lender. [11] | Capital calls, authority, affiliate flows and decision package. |
| Golf Saudi / Saudi Golf Federation | Early strategy and PGL meeting counterparties. [1][7] | Mandates, minutes, tender files and work-product custody. |
| World Golf Group / Premier Golf League | Pre-LIV proposer and 2026 litigation claimant. [1][23] | Contemporaneous pitch, confidential information, claimed loss. |
| Raine Group / Raine Investor Group SPV | PGL fundraising and negotiating vehicle as described in pleadings. [1][23] | Investment terms, funder identities, mandate and exit. |
| McKinsey & Company | Reported Project Wedge scenario adviser. [3][5] | Fees, complete model, authors and submitted recommendations. |
| Boston Consulting Group | Earlier Saudi golf-framework collaborator reported by 54 executive. [7] | Separate contract and exact scope. |
| 54 / Performance54 | Adviser, event operator and minority LIV equity holder per its account and court disclosure. [6][11] | Contracts, subcontractors, equity consideration and fees. |
| Sanabil Investments | PIF-linked investor in Performance54 reported by transaction adviser. [10] | Price, historical and current ownership, dividend flow. |
| ROSHN / Riyadh Air | LIV commercial partners with PIF affiliations. [13][14] | Sponsor price, consideration, collection and valuation. |
| Asian Tour | Strategic competition ecosystem partner and a listed unsecured creditor. [19][21] | Committed versus paid support; unpaid $1,018,542.73 claim. |
| IMG media entities | Broadcast or media-related supplier group listed as creditor. [21] | Three named creditor entities and scope of $3.2m trade claim. |
| GSE Worldwide | Sports representation-related business listed as creditor. [21] | Service scope and segregation of player agency from LIV procurement. |
| MDLBEAST Company | Saudi entertainment vendor listed as creditor. [21] | Specific event invoices behind $1,645,707.50. |
| Rick Shiels Media Limited | Brand-partnership creditor listed in court petition. [21] | Contract, deliverables, equity cross-ownership where applicable. |
| Gibson Dunn / Cole Schotz | Lead and co-counsel to debtors in restructuring. [22] | Fee approvals and conflicts during court process. |
| AlixPartners / AP Services | Financial adviser and interim management/CRO provider. [11] | Engagement date, work and fee budget. |
| Ducera Partners | Investment banker running financing/sale outreach. [11][22] | Bid log, success fee, alternatives and valuations. |
| BC Partners Credit | Restructuring support agreement counterparty, contemplated plan sponsor. [11][22] | Committed versus conditional funding and whether consideration values tax assets. |
| C Street Advisory Group | Restructuring strategic communications adviser. [22] | Engagement and fee. |
| Paul Weiss / Rimon | Counsel to BC Partners Credit per LIV announcement. [22] | Represented client and potential conflicts. |
| Lloyds Bank | Security beneficiary in 54’s 2026 UK filings. [17] | Secured obligations, schedules and relation, if any, to LIV. |
| JPMorgan / Barclays | Banks identified as holding multiple LIV-group accounts. [11] | Account ownership and reconciled transfers; no inference of wrongdoing. |
| Omni Agent Solutions | Claims and noticing agent in US Chapter 11. [22] | Claims register, updates and distributions. |
10. Corporate map: each debtor is a separate legal entity
The US petition names Jersey and UK parents and US/UK operating or special-purpose companies. The list includes LIV Golf Investments Ltd; LIV Golf Holdings Ltd; LIV Golf Incorporated; Wedge IP Management Co, Limited and Wedge IP Management Co, LLC; LIV Golf Ltd; LIV Golf Events (ISE) Ltd and LIV Golf Events Limited; LIV Golf US Media, LLC; Wedge Event 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 companies; Wedge WPB Inc.; Fairway TM Blocker 1–13; Fairway TM Intermediate 1–13; and Fairway TM Co 1–13, with certain GP/LP distinctions. A naming pattern suggests team or intellectual-property segmentation, but the exact asset and cash ownership of each cannot be inferred from its name. Obtain every schedule of intercompany claims and intellectual-property licences. [21]
The petition lists LIV Golf Holdings Ltd as holder of 100% of LIV Golf Incorporated stock at petition date. That is a direct legal holding in one debtor, not a contradiction of PIF’s reported ultimate control. Separate registered shareholders, indirect economic interests and voting arrangements. Likewise distinguish Jersey administration from US Chapter 11 recognition and UK proceedings. [9][21][22]
11. September 2026 creditors: named amounts, not historic total paid
The following figures are the petition’s unsecured-claim amounts at its filing date, rounded here only for readability in the analysis; the exact amounts are preserved in the register below. “C,” “U” and “D” in the filing mean contingent, unliquidated and disputed. A listed claim is not an allowed claim and does not reveal how much the claimant received previously. [21]
| Creditor as listed | Claim at petition | Nature/status |
| Jon Rahm / Rahm; LLC | $7,472,527.47 | player |
| Bryson DeChambeau / BAD Enterprises | $5,769,230.77 | player; C |
| Dustin Johnson / Dustin Johnson Enterprises | $5,489,010.99 | player; C/U/D |
| Cameron Smith / Golf Dude Enterprises | $4,835,164.84 | player |
| Adrian Meronk | $4,436,813.19 | player |
| Tyrrell Hatton / golf company | $3,373,626.37 | player |
| Gerry L Watson | $3,324,389.10 | player |
| IMG Media Ltd / Singapore / Korea | $3,200,000.00 | trade supplier |
| Abraham Ancer / golf company | $2,651,098.90 | player |
| Byeong Hun An / BENA Golf | $1,811,010.68 | player |
| UNHCR | $1,717,000.00 | grant; C |
| Brooks Koepka / golf company | $1,681,278.54 | agreement |
| MDLBEAST Company | $1,645,707.50 | trade supplier |
| Ming Entertainment Group | $1,593,474.84 | workforce solutions |
| Havoc Live LLC | $1,462,512.88 | trade supplier |
| Rick Shiels Media Limited | $1,398,300.00 | brand partnership |
| Caleb Surratt | $1,331,116.76 | player |
| Joaquin Niemann / company | $1,307,692.31 | player |
| GSE Worldwide | $1,287,500.00 | trade supplier |
| State of Louisiana | $1,220,000.00 | agreement |
| Fresh Tape Media LLC | $1,208,860.15 | supplier/litigation; C/D |
| Asian Tour Ltd | $1,018,542.73 | agreement; C |
| 89 Blocks Holding / EverWonder Studio | $1,014,280.26 | supplier |
| Lucas Herbert | $1,012,204.95 | player |
| Fantasy Interactive Inc. | $992,870.75 | supplier/litigation; C/D |
| Outlyr LLC | $983,625.00 | supplier |
| Thomas McKibbin | $973,109.89 | player |
| WGG and PGL | undetermined | litigation; C/U/D |
| Stonehill Estate Co. | undetermined | litigation; C/U/D |
| Kobalt / BMG / Concord | undetermined | litigation; C/U/D |
The UNHCR entry is an especially important guard against simplistic beneficiary narratives: a listed $1.717 million contingent grant obligation is not evidence of an illicit transfer, an executed gift of that amount, or a completed payment. The State of Louisiana agreement likewise requires the underlying contract and performance schedule. Disputed litigation entries cannot be added as known debt. [21]
12. Player compensation and agency economics
The restructuring officer says the LIV model used guaranteed upfront commitment payments, annual payments, some player team equity and individual/team prize purses. In return certain sponsorship inventory and name/image/likeness rights went to the league or teams, subject to individual contractual reservations. Thus a headline “signing bonus,” annual guarantee, prize cheque, franchise equity and unpaid creditor amount are distinct economic categories. A contract may front-load cash while creating future obligations; a rumored contract headline cannot be treated as a settled bank transfer. [11]
For Phil Mickelson, Dustin Johnson, Bryson DeChambeau, Jon Rahm and others, media-repeated nine-figure signing values circulate. Unless a signed agreement and payment schedule are available, enter them only as unverified reporting, never as a line in the transaction ledger. The 2026 claim listing supplies actual named unpaid balances and entity names but still is debtor-supplied and subject to objection. Agent commission flows are not shown merely because GSE Worldwide or IMG appears as a trade creditor. Require player service-company ownership, agent mandate, commission schedule, invoices and wires. [11][21][25]
The league’s declaration puts 57 golfers on its 2026 roster, of whom 52 were placed in 13 teams and five competed as wild cards. It describes a 14-tournament schedule in the model, with shorter 54-hole format originally and 72 holes introduced late 2025. Event schedule, pay guarantee and sponsor rights must be compared by season; a 2022 pricing assumption may cease to describe 2026 contracts. [11]
13. Rebuilding a transaction-level money trail, 2021–26
Funding authorization
Begin at PIF capital approvals; extract approval date, approver, commitment currency, instrument, source account and payee account. Distinguish board ceiling from actual executed draw. For each capital call link PIF advice to receiving entity equity ledger and bank credit. Identify exchange conversion and intercompany on-lending. The debtor’s approximately $5 billion total is the outer control number, not a complete table of individual transfers. [11]
Contracts and procurement
For each player, agent, consultant, venue, broadcaster, production company and event contractor, compare request for proposal, conflict declaration, signed agreement, amendments, purchase order, milestone acceptance, invoice, tax record and bank credit. Check whether payments were made directly or through a management-services affiliate. [6][11]
54 and its subcontractors
Reconcile the reported $102 million 2023 LIV-related figure to recipient company accounts, not the 54 group’s gross global revenue. Map subcontractors and any pass-through margin; match consulting outputs with the board’s need for independent advice. Measure any equity stake separately from cash fees. [6][10][11][12]
Player and agent flows
Compare guarantee schedules against team/prize results and financing costs; track payment to personal management companies, agencies and tax jurisdictions without assuming the individual took home the full gross figure. The court’s creditor schedule shows a late payable, not original contract cost. [11][21]
Commercial receipts
Separate genuinely independent sponsor receipts, host fees, ticket proceeds, broadcast sales and transactions funded by PIF-controlled affiliates. Check date and collectability of each booked receivable and whether reciprocal obligations exist. [11][13][14]
Cash at restructuring
Reconcile the roughly $15 million cash snapshot with 40 accounts, restricted cash, unpresented payments and bank debt. The approximate $495 million secured loan and $49.6 million proposed DIP are financing categories at different moments; they cannot be silently merged with capital spent. [11][22]
14. The abrupt April 2026 funding change and Chapter 11
The September first-day declaration attributes a decision to PIF in April 2026: no further equity infusions because continuing support did not align with PIF investment strategy. The same account states that PIF agreed to fund the remainder of the 2026 season via secured lending. This is a key governance pivot: obtain the April resolution, the rejected continuation options, any cash needs forecast, and all communications with players and sponsors about continued performance. It is not sound to state that all Saudi financial involvement ended in April. [11]
LIV hired Gibson Dunn as restructuring counsel, AlixPartners (with AP Services later providing interim management) as financial adviser, Ducera as investment banker and Gene Davis and Jon Zinman as independent directors. David Orlofsky became CRO on 7 September. The company says a marketing process led to BC Partners Credit as proposed plan sponsor. Compare Ducera’s outreach list, bidder non-disclosure agreements, indications of interest and valuation work before concluding the sale process was competitive. [11][22]
The company filed Chapter 11 on 8 September 2026 in New Jersey and requested a $49.6 million new-money, priming debtor-in-possession facility from PIF, subject to court approval. The declaration’s target was emergence in January 2027. The announced plan contemplates players as majority owners of the reorganized company, but requires court and stakeholder approval and negotiations; it is not yet completed player ownership. Company disclosure says BC Partners Credit and possible minority investors would provide exit financing at emergence. [11][22][26]
A Financial Times report dated 21 September described friction between PIF and BC Partners around whether the latter would supply immediate cash and around the value of tax-loss attributes, with reported $10 million near-term funding and a $300 million proposed future commitment. These are reported negotiation positions, not executed distributions to creditors. Review term sheets, commitment letters, closing conditions, NOL restrictions and actual plan confirmation. [24]
15. The 1 February 2026 request: reconstruction plan
The earlier phrasing “where is the 1 February 2026 funding memo?” risks suggesting the signed document has been located. It has not. One specialist report ascribes an approximately $266.6 million approval to Al-Rumayyan on that date. The precise source artifact, legal entity and distinction among request, approval, loan/equity authorization and transfer have not been established independently. Treat the number as a lead and interrogate it from four ends: PIF outgoing ledger; recipient bank credits; the entity’s financing resolutions; and payments out to players, agents and suppliers. [15]
Ask whether February support was budgeted for the remainder of the season or revised after April’s no-more-equity decision. Any apparent discrepancy between February approved funds and September’s “approximately $5 billion” cumulative equity may simply reflect debt classification, cutoff dates or rounding. Proof of missing money requires a balanced opening-to-closing reconciliation with identified counterparties. [11][15][16]
16. McKinsey hypotheses tested against later outcomes
Question one is assumption provenance: were top-12-player acquisition, sponsor conversion, broadcast reach and competitive response input by PIF staff, intermediaries or the consultant? Model assumptions can be aggressive without a deceptive recommendation. Question two is scenario visibility: did the complete loss case reach Al-Rumayyan and the committee before approval? Question three is measurement: what outcomes were projected for 2022–26, not merely the 2028 best case, and how often were these reforecast? Question four is independence: did advisers or suppliers benefiting from league launch help write their own forecast inputs? [3][4][5]
The later declaration says LIV continually operated at a loss and remained years from standalone profitability. This supports an ex-post assessment that commercialization was slower than needed; it does not prove 2021 advisers predicted failure or suppressed warnings. Avoid treating bankruptcy as automatic evidence of an original fraudulent projection. Compare ex-ante assumptions with contemporaneous decision records and milestone-based board reviews. [11]
17. Relationships among advisers, owners and counterparties
Three overlapping roles require exact dates: Performance54’s prelaunch operational influence and later reported fees; its disclosed LIV common equity interest; and Sanabil’s investment in its corporate group. A procurement red flag exists when a supplier helps select vendors or structure a transaction while holding a financial interest in its outcome. To test it, identify its governance rights and who signed each invoice; the public record does not establish that any fee was improperly obtained. [6][10][11]
BC Partners Credit’s future involvement and GSE Worldwide’s presence among trade creditors invite a conflict inquiry only after the actual legal relationship is documented. A private-equity brand can house separate strategies and portfolio positions; mere brand overlap is insufficient to claim the investor is paying itself. Seek fund ownership, investment committee file, agency representation agreements and recusal record. [21][22]
A prospective 2023 PGA Tour–PIF agreement and later LIV restructuring should be kept separate. Congressional documents discussed draft governance clauses concerning LIV personnel and suppliers. Later failure to implement a draft is not breach of an executed agreement. PIF’s relationship with PGA TOUR Enterprises or Strategic Sports Group cannot be conflated with PIF’s ownership of LIV or with the PGA Tour’s nonprofit historical structure. [18]
18. Documentary audit tests and prioritization
| Priority | Records and reconciliation | Question |
| A / Foundation | Obtain all entity incorporation files, cap tables, the PGL early pitch, PIF committee minutes and McKinsey engagement and source files. | Who originated the project and which legal entity was approved? |
| B / Capital bridge | PIF bank debit → LIV recipient bank credit → equity/debt journal → downstream payee. | Which dollars were actually transferred, and under which instrument? |
| C / Supplier benefit | 54/Sanabil shareholder chronology → tender → contract → accepted deliverable → invoice → downstream subcontractor. | Were services reasonably priced and conflicts managed? |
| D / Decision integrity | Original McKinsey working model → consultant delivery → edited committee pack → approval minutes → ex-post review. | Who presented upside/downside, and was risk visible? |
| E / Sponsor substance | Sponsor purchase order → deliverables → third-party price comparator → accounts receivable → collected bank amount. | How much 2025 revenue came from related entities, and was it paid? |
| F / Insolvency | 2026 monthly cash projections → April PIF resolution → secured-loan draws → 8 September creditor claims → DIP orders. | What changed, when did management know, who bore the loss? |
For publication, mark each asserted sum as one of: signed commitment; board authorization; actual payment; accrued expense; unpaid claim; forecast; potential tax asset; or allegation. Date-stamp each figure and identify currency, source document and entity. Record “unknown” rather than extrapolate a recipient. Cross-border scrutiny requires Saudi authorizations, UK accounts, Jersey ownership and US court schedules in the same workbook.
19. Responses sought before publication
Offer Yasir Al-Rumayyan and PIF the specific first-pitch, board-pack, fee, February authorization and equity-to-debt questions; ask McKinsey whether it authored the investment recommendation and what caveats traveled with the optimistic case; ask 54 and Sanabil for contracts, fee reconciliation and equity consideration; ask LIV, BC Partners and Ducera about funding conditions and alternatives; ask PGL/WGG, Marsh and Moore to identify actual documents and to respond to contrary chronology. Give each party the precise text concerning them, a fair reply deadline and a correction channel. Silence is not admission.
Questions on LIV Golf Funding and Governance
Source register
Bracketed numbers in the text refer to these source URLs. Court filings establish what their filers represent; they do not independently prove each commercial allegation. Estimates and media reports are identified as such.
[1] ESPN, report on WGG/PGL complaint, April 2026. https://www.espn.co.uk/golf/story/_/id/49299774/companies-claiming-world-golf-league-concept-sue-liv-others
[2] Gardiner interview, February 2020. https://www.geoffshackelford.com/homepage/2020/2/21/qampa-with-andy-gardiner-ceo-of-the-premier-golf-league
[3] Contemporaneous reporting on confidential McKinsey records. https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/lifestyle/confidential-records-show-saudi-golf-tour-built-far-fetched-assumptions
[4] Golf Channel, McKinsey scenarios and financial projections. https://www.golfchannel.com/news/report-signing-tiger-woods-only-part-livs-fantastical-plan-seize-mantle-dominance
[5] U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, letter to McKinsey, August 2023. https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023-08-16-Blumenthal-Request-to-McKinsey-re-Documents-and-Information_Redacted.pdf
[6] 54, LIV Golf case study (company account). https://www.weare54.com/case-studies/liv-golf
[7] MyGolfSpy, interview with Performance54 executive. https://mygolfspy.com/news-opinion/liv-the-saudis-and-performance54/
[8] UK Companies House, LIV Golf Ltd corporate record. https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/13473438
[9] Government of Jersey Gazette, LIV Golf Investments Ltd administration. https://www.gov.je/gazette/Pages/LGIL.aspx
[10] HMT LLP, Sanabil–Performance54 transaction. https://www.hmtllp.com/deals/performance54-targets-global-expansion-with-investment-from-sanabil/
[11] U.S. court, first-day declaration in LIV restructuring, September 2026. https://casedocs.omniagentsolutions.com/cmsvol2/pub_47610/88c682ec-4bbc-42c8-bf95-12d01399554c_27.pdf
[12] Reuters, LIV investment and Performance54 fee reporting, February 2025. https://www.reuters.com/sports/tennis/report-pifs-liv-golf-investment-nearing-5b-losses-mount-2025-02-14/
[13] LIV Golf, official partner listing. https://www.livgolf.com/partners
[14] ROSHN, LIV partnership press release. https://www.roshn.sa/news-and-events/press-releases/article-36
[15] Money in Sport, February 2026 funding report. https://moneyinsport.substack.com/p/pif-approves-267-million-of-fresh
[16] Money in Sport, later lending/funding report. https://moneyinsport.substack.com/p/liv-golf-is-running-on-loans-now
[17] UK Companies House, Performance54 security filings. https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/13167959/charges
[18] U.S. Senate PSI, preliminary framework-agreement memorandum, July 2023. https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023-07-10-PSI-Majority-Staff-Memorandum-Regarding-Preliminary-Information-on-Agreement-Between-PGA-Tour-and-Saudi-Arabian-Public-Investment-Fund-with-Consolidated-Appendix.pdf
[19] Money in Sport, analysis of LIV Golf economics. https://moneyinsport.substack.com/p/can-liv-golf-ever-make-money
[20] U.S. court, LIV Golf initial docket and affiliate disclosures. https://dockets.justia.com/docket/california/candce/5%3A2022cv04486/398834
[21] New Jersey bankruptcy petition and 30 largest unsecured claims, 8 September 2026. https://casedocs.omniagentsolutions.com/cmsvol2/pub_47610/b1f3133f-39e9-4e6e-8e07-ba9eaf31a2fb_190-1.pdf
[22] LIV Golf press statement on restructuring and advisers, 8 September 2026. https://www.livgolf.com/news/liv-golf-takes-strategic-action
[23] LIV players’ 2022 antitrust complaint against PGA Tour, paragraphs 78–81. https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/california/candce/5:2022cv04486/398834/1
[24] Financial Times, PIF–BC Partners restructuring tensions, 21 September 2026. https://www.ft.com/content/b0125efa-396b-4650-be90-a8a5a7fc51e6
[25] Reuters, LIV Chapter 11 filing and creditors, September 2026. https://www.reuters.com/sports/golf/liv-golf-files-bankruptcy-with-stars-owed-millions–flm-2026-09-08/
[26] LIV Golf debtor-in-possession financing motion. https://casedocs.omniagentsolutions.com/cmsvol2/pub_47610/b6a92e0d-c15d-4a11-98df-4599493cc89a_22.pdf
